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Abstract
Trade-off between security and performance has become an intriguing area in
recent years in both the security and performance communities. As the secu-
rity aspects of security protocol research is fully-fledged, this thesis is therefore
devoted to conducting a performance study of these protocols. The long term
objective is to translate formal definitions of security protocols to formal per-
formance models automatically, then analysing by relevant techniques. In this
thesis, we take a preliminary step by studying five typical security protocols, and
exploring the methodology of construction and analysis of their models by us-
ing the Markovian process algebra PEPA. Through these case studies, an initial
framework of performance analysis of security protocol is established.
Firstly, a key distribution centre is investigated. The basic model suffers from the
commonly encountered state space explosion problem, and so we apply some effi-
cient solution techniques, which include model reduction techniques and ordinary
differential equation based fluid flow analysis. Finally, we evaluate a utility func-
tion for this secure key exchange model. Then, we explore two non-repudiation
protocols. Mean value analysis has been applied here for a class of PEPA models,
and it is compared with an ODE approximation. After that, an optimistic non-
repudiation protocol with off-line third trust party is studied. The PEPA model
has been formulated using a concept of multi-threaded servers with functional
rates. The final case study is a cross-realm Kerberos protocol. A simplified
technique of aggregation with an ODE approximation is performed to do effi-
cient analysis. All these modelling and analysis methods are illustrated through
numerical examples.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Aims
One of the more intriguing areas of system engineering to emerge over recent
years has been the study of the performance overhead introduced by making a
system secure. According to Stallings [59]:
“The more frequently session keys are exchanged, the more secure
they are, because the opponent has less cipher text to work with for
any given session key. On the other hand, the distribution of session
keys delays the start of any exchange and places a burden on network
capacity. A security manager must try to balance these competing
considerations in determining the lifetime of a particular session key.”
It is clear that as more functionality is added to a system, more execution time
is required to complete the additional tasks involved. However, in the case of
security, the benefit accrued from any additional overhead is not easy to quan-
tify and so it is very hard for the performance engineer to argue a particular
performance target should take precedence over a security goal. One area where
alternative secure solutions exist is in cryptography, where there may be a choice
of algorithm, or even a choice of key length, which will greatly influence the
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performance of the system. In many situations performance also contribute to
the security rather than just speeding up or slowing down the system. Under a
poor performance, the legitimate protocol actions might lead the system to leak
restricted information. If the scalability of system under heavy load, the security
protocol is potentially vulnerable by timing attacks, and it is also very likely to
expose a functional flaw. Moreover, if we consider a user send or exchange some
restrict information under a security protocol which has a very good security but
execute slowly. The user is likely to lose his patient to wait, or do not have enough
time to wait. Under the situation, the user might avoid the security protocol and
send his information by insecure means. Finally recalling our quoted paragraph
above, if a client holding a session key to wait a very long time in a key exchange
protocol, the hackers may obtain more cipher text and also has more time to
work on cracking the key. From the motivation, cryptographic protocols are one
of the few areas of security to have received much attention from the both per-
formance and security community. To date this work has been largely limited to
measurement and has not addressed the underlying causes of delay which might
be understood by modelling or detailed code analysis.
If a trade-off problem is being faced by a security manager, how to choose or how
to use a protocol becomes a major issue. Security properties of common security
protocols are generally well understood. However, investigation of performance
aspects of the security protocols is usually ignored in the development stage.
Hence, security managers need to study a new protocol every time a trade-off
analysis is required. This motivated us to investigate the idea that whether we
can translate a security protocol from a security aspect model to a performance
model, and then, manipulate the performance model to fit different environment,
and finally choose suitable analysis techniques to analyse the protocol to obtain
performance metrics, e.g. utilisation, response time, queue length, etc. (see
Figure 1.1) As the security protocols are usually modelled by process algebra,
obviously, the best type of performance model formalism as the translation is
stochastic process algebra. This translation can keep the formality of the security
protocols and can also be formally analysed and reasoned. That is also one of the
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major reasons for using PEPA (this modelling language introduced in Chapter 2)
in this work. O’Shea has been working on the translation of security protocols,
and a naive version has been implemented in [49].
A → S : A, B, NA
………
A = (sendToS, r).A1
………
S=(sendToS,infty).S
………
A[N] <sendToS> S[M]
Response time
Utilisation
Queuing length
………
translation
fitting scenario
analysis
Figure 1.1: An overview of performance analysis of security protocol
The work in this thesis focuses on the later part of our initial idea. After obtain-
ing a translated performance model, which is assumed to use a stochastic process
algebra, we then investigate how to manipulate the model to fit different scenar-
ios and what kind of analysis techniques can be employed to different types of
protocols. By doing this, a security manager could easily study the performance
aspects of security protocols, even if the translation is not automatic. In addition,
because the state space explosion becomes a major issue in formal analysis, we
primarily focus on efficient and scalable solutions for analysis. In this thesis, four
different kinds of security protocols have been investigated. Several modelling
styles and analysis techniques have been explored with these protocols, and the
advantages and disadvantages of these techniques has been addressed. Through
these cases studies, we aim to produce a initial version of framework by which
arbitrary security protocols can be analysed for performance and possibly the
trade-off between performance and security for security managers. We propose a
rough work flow that is followed for these case studies in Figure 1.2.
The first step is modelling the system by PEPA. We then simplify the model to
make it easier for analysis. After that, the model is analysed by some techniques.
Once the metrics (such as queue length and response time) are obtained, we utilise
it in a cost function analysis. By the cost function, one can conduct scalability
3
System Performance model
Model 
simplification
Cost function 
analysis
AnalysisMetrics
Figure 1.2: The work flow of performance analysis in context
management and capacity planning to the system.
1.2 Outline of thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) This chapter generally reviewed the technical
background which includes the PEPA language and its steady state analysis tech-
niques, especially, solutions for large scale methodologies, and the case studies
about performance analysis of security related applications.
Chapter 3 (Key Distribution Centre) In this chapter we explore perfor-
mance of a model of a key distribution centre. The basic model suffers from
the commonly encountered state space explosion problem, and so we apply some
efficient techniques, including model simplification (partial evaluation) and ODE
based fluid flow analysis, to solve it. Finally, we evaluate a utility function of
this secure key exchange model. The analysis techniques are explored through
numerical results. The approximation is compared with discrete event simulation
and the ODE results are verified by stochastic simulation.
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Chapter 4 (Non-repudiation Protocols ZG1&ZG3) In this chapter we
study the overhead introduced by secure functions in considering two of non-
repudiation protocols. Again, considering scalable analysis and following the pre-
vious study of performance modelling on the KDC, partial evaluation and fluid
flow approximation based on ordinary differential equations (ODEs) have been
chosen. Then, traditional mean value analysis (MVA) is applied to PEPA mod-
els here. Additionally, Functional Rates has been adopted in the second model
(ZG3) to avoid unintended system behaviour. The models are analyzed numeri-
cally and results derived from mean value analysis are compared with the ODE
solution.
Chapter 5 (An Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocol) This chapter studies an
optimistic fair exchange e-commerce protocol, which is in fact a non-repudiation
protocol with an off-line third trust party (TTP). Two PEPA models are formu-
lated in two cases: without TTP (no misbehaviour) and with TTP (misbehavior
exists). A multiple threads modelling concept and a new version of functional
rates has been adopted here. Following the case studies in the last two chapters,
partial evaluation and the most efficient ODE approximation are employed, and
concept of functional rates for ZG3 is utilised in the model of the TTP involving.
The analysis is explored numerically and compared with stochastic simulation.
Chapter 6 (Kerberos Protocol) In this chapter an authentication protocol,
Kerberos, is investigated. To consider the scenario of the multi-realms environ-
ment, a new type of simplification is applied. The simplified model is equivalent
to original model only in terms of the steady state distribution, and it is analysed
numerically by our previously studied fluid flow approximation, then, again it is
verified by stochastic simulation.
Chapter 7 (Conclusion and Further Work) This chapter gives a conclusion
of this thesis and proposes further work.
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1.4 Contributions
The main contributions are summarised following:
• The development of partial evaluation techniques that can be used to permit
fluid analysis in Chapter 3. This is a general simplification technique which
can reduced the system component in the model, and can be applied by a
range of protocols in some scenarios.
• We identify the diverge point (N∗) in fluid flow analysis with PEPA, and
discuss engineering approach to tackle engineering approximation of ODE
analysis in Chapter 3.
• We identify that in closed queueing network model, the ODE analysis of its
equivalent PEPA model is exactly the same to the asymptotic bounds of it.
• The Mean Value Analysis has firstly been applied to a range of PEPA
models, and it is detailed compared with fluid flow analysis in Chapter 2
and 4.
• Two version of non-repudiation protocols are analysed and compared in
terms of their trade-off between performance and security in Chapter 4.
• We employ functional rates in Chapter 4 in PEPA model to solve an un-
intended completion between different service actions. It is also can be
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considered as a simplification, as it avoids to specify the detailed behaviour
of the non-repudiation server.
• We apply multi-threads modelling form for an optimistic fair exchange pro-
tocol in Chapter 5.
• The optimistic fair exchange protocol with misbehaviour and without mis-
behaviour are explored and compared in Chapter 5.
• An aggregation technique has been applied to Keberos protocol for efficient
analysis in Chapter 6.
• Utility function is proposed and analysed for all cases studies from Chapter
3 to Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews several literatures related to this thesis. Section 2.1 intro-
duces the PEPA modelling language used throughout this thesis, and solution
methods for large scale systems. Solutions like simulation, fluid flow analysis
and mean value analysis are described precisely, because they are applied to the
models in the subsequent chapters. Other solution methods are only given a brief
description. The analysis techniques described here all give rise to steady state
solutions. The mean value analysis is the novel contribution of the work presented
here. Furthermore, some related work are surveyed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Specification and Solution of Large PEPA
Models
2.1.1 PEPA
In this thesis we model protocols using the Markovian process algebra PEPA.
This approach has a number of advantages over a direct approach using Markov
chains. As a formal specification, a PEPA model can be derived automatically
from, and compared automatically with, formal definitions of the protocol we
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are modelling. Functional properties of the model, such as deadlock freeness,
can also be checked automatically. These attributes of the model specification
are particularly important in the field of security, where correctness is vital if
security properties are to be maintained. Furthermore, the analysis of the model
we are considering here is based on formulating progressively simplified versions of
the model. Because of the formal nature of the specification we can apply formal
transformations to the model based on known concepts of equivalence. Therefore
we know that the approximate model we derive shares certain properties with the
original model. In brief, we know, and can prove, that the approximation is still
a valid model of the original protocol. This would not be possible if we simply
chose the approximation by some expert intuition or arrived at it by some less
formal means. Furthermore, by taking this approach we can apply the same set
of techniques to other related protocols, potentially automating the solution.
A formal presentation of PEPA is given in [33], in this section a brief informal
summary is presented. PEPA, being a Markovian Process Algebra, only sup-
ports actions that occur with rates that are negative exponentially distributed.
Specifications written in PEPA represent Markov processes and can be mapped
to a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). Systems are specified in PEPA in
terms of activities and components. An activity (α, r) is described by the type of
the activity, α, and the rate of the associated negative exponential distribution,
r. This rate may be any positive real number, or given as unspecified using the
symbol >.
2.1.1.1 Syntax
The syntax for describing components is given as:
(α, r).P | P +Q | P/L | P BCL Q | A
The component (α, r).P performs the activity of type α at rate r and then behaves
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like P . The component P + Q behaves either like P or like Q, the resultant
behaviour being given by the first activity to complete.
The component P/L behaves exactly like P except that the activities in the set
L are concealed, their type is not visible and instead appears as the unknown
type τ .
Concurrent components can be synchronised, P BCL Q, such that activities in the
cooperation set L involve the participation of both components. In PEPA the
shared activity occurs at the slowest of the rates of the participants and if a rate
is unspecified in a component, the component is passive with respect to activities
of that type. A
def
= P gives the constant A the behaviour of the component P .
In this thesis we consider only models which are cyclic, that is, every derivative
of components P and Q are reachable in the model description P BCL Q. Neces-
sary conditions for a cyclic model may be defined on the component and model
definitions without recourse to the entire state space of the model.
2.1.1.2 Apparent rate and Operational semantic
The Apparent rate is defined as the externally observed rate of that type of
activity. Consider the case where N clients waiting in a queue for K (K < N)
servers with single service rate µ, this is the same as that the N clients are served
by a single server with the service rate Kµ. More formally, the apparent rate of
action type α in a component P , denoted by rα(P ), is the sum of the rates of all
activities of type α which can be performed by P . It is formulated as follows:
1. rα((β, r).P ) =
 r ifβ = α0 ifβ 6= α
2. rα(P +Q) = rα(P ) + rα(Q)
3. rα(P/L) =
 rα(P ) ifα /∈ L0 ifα ∈ L
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4. rα(P BC
L
Q) =
 rα(P ) + rα(Q) ifα /∈ Lmin(rα(P ), rα(Q)) ifα ∈ L
The Operational semantic of PEPA defines the rules of how the system enables.
Figure 2.1 formally presents the operational semantics of PEPA, in which the
operational rules are given and that if the transition above the inference line
can be inferred, then we can infer the transition below the line. Following the
rules, a labelled transition system can be generated which represents an underlying
Markov chain for the PEPA model.
3.3. THE PEPA LANGUAGE 29
Prefix
(α, r).E
(α,r)−−−→ E
Choice
E
(α,r)−−−→ E′
E + F
(α,r)−−−→ E′
F
(α,r)−−−→ F ′
E + F
(α,r)−−−→ F ′
Cooperation
E
(α,r)−−−→ E′
E BC
L
F
(α,r)−−−→ E′ BC
L
F
(α /∈ L) F
(α,r)−−−→ F ′
E BC
L
F
(α,r)−−−→ E BC
L
F ′
(α /∈ L)
E
(α,r1)−−−→ E′ F (α,r2)−−−→ F ′
E BC
L
F
(α,R)−−−→ E′ BC
L
F ′
(α ∈ L) where R = r1
rα(E)
r2
rα(F )
min(rα(E), rα(F ))
Hiding
E
(α,r)−−−→ E′
E/L
(α,r)−−−→ E′/L
(α /∈ L) E
(α,r)−−−→ E′
E/L
(τ,r)−−−→ E′/L
(α ∈ L)
Constant
E
(α,r)−→ E′
A
(α,r)−→ E′
(A
def
= E)
Figure 3.1: Operational Semantics of PEPA
For any activity instance its activity rate is the product of the apparent rate of the action
type in this component and the probability, given that an activity of this type occurs, that
it is this instance that completes. This leads to the following rule:
E
(α,r1)−−−→ E′ F (α,r2)−−−→ F ′
E BC
L
F
(α,R)−−−→ E′ BC
L
F ′
(α ∈ L) where R = r1
rα(E)
r2
rα(F )
min(rα(E), rα(F ))
On the basis of the semantic rules PEPA can be defined as a labelled multi-transition
system. In general a labelled transition system (S, T, { t→ | t ∈ T}) is a system defined by
a set of states S, a set of transition labels T and a transition relation
t→ ⊆ S × S for each
t ∈ T . In a multi-transition system the relation is replaced by a multi-relation in which
the number of instances of a transition between states is recognised. Thus PEPA may be
Figure 2.1: Operational Semantic of PEPA
12
2.1.1.3 A simple example
Here is a simple and well known example following [33] (page 25):
Process0
def
= (use, r1).P rocess1
Process1
def
= (task, r2).P rocess0
Resource0
def
= (use, r3).Resource1
Resource1
def
= (update, r4).Resource0
System
def
= Process0 BC
use
Resource0
The model describes a simple system in which a process executes some task cycli-
cally, and it must utilize a resource firstly to finish the task. Meanwhile, the
resource is only not available when being accessed by the process, and then reset
the state for other processes. Therefore, the Process component will undertake
two activities with two states (Process0 and Process1) in the model. Process0
use with rate r1, and Process1 task with rate r2. Similarly, Resource0 , rep-
resents a state of Resource, which carries out action use, in cooperation with
Process, and another state Resource1 update at rate r4. Finally, the system is
interpreted by initial states (Process0, Resource0) for each component cooper-
ating over action use. This example, referred to as the Process/Resource Model,
is utilized to illustrate some of the solutions throughout this chapter.
2.1.2 Notions of equivalence
Concept of equivalence is usually used for investigating the relationship between
two models in process algebra, and it is also very useful to simplify the complex
model to a neat version for analysis. This Section introduces several notions of
equivalence of PEPA that proposed by Hillston in [33].
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2.1.2.1 Bisimulations
The bisimuation is based on the observable behaviour. Two components are
considered bisimulation if their behaviour appears the same to a external observer,
denoted by ∼. Therefore, if P ∼ Q, an action performed by P must match the
related action with Q, and also the subsequent actions must also be matched. The
formal definition can be referred to [33]. We use a simple example to demonstrate
the concept here. Two components P and Q are defined in PEPA as follows.
P
def
= (task1, r1).P1
P1
def
= (task2, r2).P
Q
def
= (task1, r1).Q1
Q1
def
= (task2, r2).Q2
Q2
def
= (task1, r1).Q3
Q3
def
= (task2, r2).Q
P perform task1 that matches Q, then its derivative P1 matches Q1. After that
P goes back to perform task1 again, however, it matches Q2 as the subsequent
derivative of Q1. Therefore P ∼ Q.
There is also a weak bisimulation concept, which allows the internal actions are
not in the set of observable actions. Let us define τ as the internal action that
can not be seen by a external observer, and redefine P as follows:
P
def
= (task1, r1).P1
P1
def
= (τ, r).P2
P2
def
= (task2, r2).P
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Now, P and Q are considered as weak bisimulation. Although there is not
matched action of Q to τ , a external observer can not observe τ of P as well.
2.1.2.2 Isomorphism and weak isomorphism
Different from bisimulation, isomorphism is not observation based, and it is a very
strong notion of equivalence, denoted by =. Two components are considered as
isomorphism if all the derivatives of one component correspond to another, and
they can perform exactly the same activities. Therefore, we must compare their
derivation graphs to show that two components are isomorphism.
To set a example, let us define component S as:
P
def
= (α, r1).P1
P1
def
= (β, r2).P
Q
def
= (α, r1).Q1
Q1
def
= (γ, r3).Q
S
def
= P BC
α
Q
and define component R as:
R
def
= (α, r1).R1
R1
def
= (β, r2).(γ, r3).R
+(γ, r3).(β, r2).R
By comparing the derivation graph of component S (Figure 2.2) and R (Figure
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2.3), we can find that their derivatives are match and they are able to carry out
exactly the same activities. Therefore, S and R are isomorphic (S = R).
P BC
α
Q
P1 BC
α
Q1
P BC
α
Q1 P1 BC
α
Q











7
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
So
?






+
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs
(α, r1)
(γ, r3) (β, r2)
(β, r2) (γ, r3)
Figure 2.2: The derivation graph of S
R
R1
(γ, r3).R (β, r2).R
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









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S
S
S
S
S
S
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S
S
S
S
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?






+
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs
(α, r1)
(γ, r3) (β, r2)
(β, r2) (γ, r3)
Figure 2.3: The derivation graph of R
Weak isomorphism has the same definition for two components as isomorphism
expect for their internal actions, τ , denoted by ≈. Therefore, τ type activities
can have the different details if two components are weak isomorphism. Let us
define component A and B as follows:
A
def
= (τ, r1).(τ, r2).A
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B
def
= (τ, r3).B
A and B are not match for the internal action τ . However, once we set r3 as
1
1
r1
+ 1
r2
, component B now has a single τ activity of equivalent total duration and
they (A and B) are have the same visible behaviour. Hence, A and B are now
weak isomorphic (A ≈ B).
2.1.2.3 Strong equivalence
Another equivalence notion of PEPA is strong equivalence. According to [33],
“Two PEPA component are strong equivalent if there is an equivalence relation
between them such that, for any type α, the total conditional transition rates
from those components to any equivalence class, via activities of this type, are
the same.” This kind of equivalence has not been used in context, one can refer
to [33] for details.
2.1.3 CTMC based methods
2.1.3.1 Derivation of CTMC
It is easy to understand from the definition of PEPA that this formalism is a
high level modelling language to a Continues-Time Markov Chain. To solve a
PEPA model, therefore, it is necessary to derive an equivalent CTMC as a first
step. The CTMC is represented by a derivation graph which is more clearly un-
derstood by an analyst. A derivation graph consists of nodes, which represent
the components and its derivatives, and arcs, which illustrate possible transitions
between the corresponding components and labeled by the action type and action
rate. According to [33] (page 32-33) and the operational semantics of PEPA,
the derivation graph of the Process/Resource Model given in Figure 2.4 can be
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drawn. It is essential to note that this only can be done manually with a small
CTMC and it has been assumed to have a finite state space.
Process0 BC
use
Resource0
Process1 BC
use
Resource1
Process0 BC
use
Resource1 Process1 BC
use
Resource0











7
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
So
?






+
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs
(use,min(r1, r3))
(update, r4) (task, r2)
(task, r2) (update, r4)
Figure 2.4: The underlying CTMC of Process/Resource Model
2.1.3.2 Matrix solution
Given the underlying CTMC derived from a PEPA model depicted in the deriva-
tion graph, we can solve the model in a number of ways. The most direct and
obvious way is solving a matrix to give the steady state distribution. [61] This
matrix, which is termed the infinitesimal generator matrix and denoted by Q, is
an n × n matrix that characterizes the n states of the CTMC. The elements qij
represent the transition rates of the system from state i to j, in the jth column
of the ith row of the matrix. The diagonal elements are chosen to ensure that
the sum of the elements in every row is zero, hence, qii = −
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
qij, where S
is state space. Once Q is obtained, the following global balance equation can be
utilised to calculate steady state distribution (pi):
piQ = 0
Where
∑
pii = 1.
To consider the small example Process/Resource model, firstly, four states can
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be identified:
X0 = Process0 BC
use
Resource0
X1 = Process1 BC
use
Resource1
X2 = Process0 BC
use
Resource1
X3 = Process1 BC
use
Resource0
Then, the infinitesimal generator matrix Q is:
Q =

−min(r1, r3) min(r1, r3) 0 0
0 −(r2 + r4) r2 r4
r4 0 −r4 0
r2 0 0 −r2

Finally, by solving the global balance equation, the steady state distribution (pi)
is obtained:
pi(X0) =
r2r4(r2 + r4)
(r2 + r4)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r22 +min(r1, r3)r
2
4
pi(X1) =
r2r4min(r1, r3)
(r2 + r4)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r22 +min(r1, r3)r
2
4
pi(X2) =
min(r1, r3)r
2
2
(r2 + r4)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r22 +min(r1, r3)r
2
4
pi(X3) =
min(r1, r3)r
2
4
(r2 + r4)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r2r4 +min(r1, r3)r22 +min(r1, r3)r
2
4
Now, from pi, one can calculate performance metrics, i.e. utilisation, throughput,
etc, by corresponding rules.
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All the above steps can be done manually, because the example is very small and
the infinitesimal generator matrix is quite small also. Under the circumstances, it
is a simple matter to solve the global balance equation by Gaussian elimination.
However, direct Gaussian elimination is infeasible when the infinitesimal genera-
tor matrix is large. An automated solution can be limited by a lack of memory,
caused by having to store a manipulate a large matrix Q. If the matrix solution
is infeasible then the iterative method, block method or projection method can
be applied to address the state space explosion problem to some extent [62].
2.1.3.3 Aggregation
As the state space explosion becomes the major issue in state space based mod-
elling, several techniques for large PEPA models have been proposed. Aggrega-
tion, which has been applied to PEPA by Gilmore, Hillston and Ribaudo [21],
is one of these methods, and it is widely used technique for reducing the size
of CTMC in performance modelling. The state space of the CTMC can be di-
vided to several classes, each of which is considered as a single state and form
a new CTMC that is relatively amenable to a matrix solution. Details of this
technique are described in [21], and a simple example is illustrated here with the
Process/Resource model:
Let us consider two processes competing for one resource in this model by rewrit-
ing the system equation as:
System
def
= (Process0||Process0)BC
use
Resource0
From this initial state, there are two one step states can be evolved by first process
engaging use with resource or second process carrying out use:
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(Process1||Process0)BC
use
Resource1
(Process0||Process1)BC
use
Resource1
Since only overall behaviour is concerned, these two states has been considered
to be two states of exactly the same class of state. After identifying all the
classes, therefore, by aggregating all the states in each class, a new CTMC can
be obtained by modifying old transition rates. Obviously, the size of new CTMC
has been reduced.
2.1.3.4 Decomposition
Decomposition is an alternative solution for state space explosion of PEPA model.
PEPA has been formally-defined as a compositional formalism on the underlying
Markov chain. This compositional characteristic may take advantage of sep-
arately solving corresponding sub-models before combing these results to the
whole model when direct solution of large models are infeasible. In such a way,
generating the global state space has been avoided.
2.1.3.4.1 Product form If the state space S of a Markov process X(t) is
in the form of S = S1 × S2, that means there are two pieces of information in
each state capturing different aspects of the current state. When the process
X(t) exhibits a product form solution, which write as pi(s) = pi1(s1) × pi2(s2),
it indicates that these different aspects of the state description are independent
with respect to their equilibrium distribution.
Product form solution is a traditional technique that has been applied to queueing
models and stochastic Petri nets. In terms of application of PEPA, refer to [35]
for details of results in the classical style.
More recently Harrison has derived a number of interesting results using proper-
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ties of the reversed process, captured in his Reversed Compound Agent Theorem
(RCAT) and its extensions [24, 26, 25, 27]. These results are particularly note-
worthy for their ability to describe previously distinct product form solutions
within the same theoretical framework.
2.1.3.4.2 Component substitution When a product form does not exist,
the PEPA models can still be decomposed under certain conditions to provide
solutions to certain global measures. The property of behavioural independence,
exploited by Thomas [63], can be applied to derive different types of decompo-
sition. In the class of PEPA model, which exhibit the property of behavioural
control, a component is amenable to be replaced by one of its simpler derivatives.
This simple component has fewer states, nevertheless, gives the same set of in-
teractions. Thomas provides an iterative solution in [66], which can be used to
obtain approximate results but is much more scalable.
2.1.3.4.3 Distributed solution Knottenbelt [40, 39] proposed another de-
composition solution of large CTMC based on distributed disk-based architecture.
This technique does not avoid solving the whole Markov chain, but is solving the
entire Markov chain in a decomposed way. The Markov chain is divided in several
partitions, then distributed to different machine to process. Finally, those dis-
tributed results are combined to a final solution in some way. Bradley [4] applied
this technique to PEPA through the IPC tool, by which a PEPA model can be
converted to an intermediate format that can be solved in distributed manner.
2.1.3.5 Kronecker
In the case of a large Markov model that consists of N submodels, the generator
matrix Q can be expressed as a set of N smaller matrices which are represented by
tensor algebra. This compact representation requires less memory for storing and
manipulating Q, and it is termed Kronecker representation. This representation
has been applied to PEPA model by Hillson and Kloul [36]. Depending on the
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functional dependency, the infinitesimal generator matrix of the Markov chain
associated with a PEPA model is expressed as:
Q =
N⊕
i=1
Ri +
∑
α∈Z
rα
(
N⊕
i=1
Pi,α −
N⊕
i=1
P¯i,α
)
where
• N is the total number of components in the PEPA model and Z is the set
of cooperating action types.
• rα is the minimum of the functional rates of action type α over all compo-
nents Ci, i = 1 . . . N .
• Ri is the transition matrix of component Ci relating solely to its individual
activities.
• Pi,α is the probability transition matrix of component Ci due to activity of
type α.
• P¯i,α is a matrix representing the normalization associated with the shared
activity α in component Ci.
One can refer to [37] for functional dependency, and details of the Kronecker
representation are illustrated by an example and validated in [36]. In gener-
ally Kronecker methods use less memory than direct matrix solution, and so are
potentially more scalable, however the solution may be slower.
2.1.4 Simulation
Simulation is usually applied to do performance analysis when the model can-
not be solved analytically or numerically, this because the state space cannot be
handled. By counting a simulation time, events occur following relevant rules,
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simulating a real system running. One can carry out a short-run or long-run
scheme to obtain different performance measures. From the time aspect, simula-
tion model can be classified broadly as either a discrete time system or continuous
time system. In a discrete time system, only selected moments in time are con-
sidered (the time at which specific events occur). In addition, some economic
models are recognized as this type, because the required data is only available
at particular instants (e.g. end of day trading figures). Continuous time can be
further classified as either continuous time continuous event system or continuous
time discrete event system. The former type studies systems where the state con-
tinuously changes with time, and will be used here as an approximate solution
that introduced in Section 2.5. Continuous time discrete event system, which
depicted in first subsection, is our most interesting class, because it describes the
same features as our PEPA model. More detailed coverage of simulation can be
found in [45, 28].
In the context of this thesis, the discrete time instants would represent stochas-
tic events, such as arrivals or service completion. There are many examples of
discrete time models of computer systems, where the time instants correspond
to system (clock) cycles. Furthermore, efficient discrete time methods may be
used to simulate continuous time systems by imposing fixed instants at which
observations can be made.
2.1.4.1 Discrete event simulation
In continuous time discrete event systems, the time parameter is continuous and
events construct a list in a chronological sequence manner. When simulating, each
event occurs at an instant in time and indicates a system state evolution. For
example, suppose that a printer is being simulated, and the system is defined only
by the number of jobs waiting for printing. Therefore, one job joining or leaving
marks a change of state and happens at a discrete time moment. There are a
number of programming languages can be utilised to discrete event simulation,
e.g. C, C++, Java, Simulink(Matlab), etc. One also can use a simulator to
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particular class of systems, for example network simulators such as NS2. Details
can be found from [2], some important components of discrete event simulation
are described as follows:
• Clock: The simulation must keep track of current simulation time, there-
fore, a simulation clock is necessary to be created. In contrast to perfor-
mance measurement on a real system, this clock hops a time interval given
by a completion of an event. The time interval is added to the clock de-
pends on the particular distribution which associated with relevant events.
In simulating a PEPA model, all time intervals are negative exponential
distributed with a mean which is reciprocal of the rate of relevant events.
• Event lists: Every event represents a potential change of state of the sys-
tem. Events in the current list are all the events that could occur in the
next system step. Therefore the event list should be updated in every sim-
ulation clock hop. The rate of each event is proportional to the probability
of which event will happen next.
• Random number generation: To determine which event will happen
in the event list, a random number should be generated. As the random
number is chosen by a computer, even the best algorithm cannot obtain a
real random number, but can only approach real random. Therefore, it is
usually termed pseudo-random number. Several algorithms can be directly
used for the simulation, these include linear congruential generators, lagged
fibonacci generators, linear feedback shift registers, feedback with carry
shift registers, Blum Blum Shub, Fortuna, and the Mersenne twister, etc.
• Termination condition: Because the simulation usually running in a
cycling manner, one should provide an ending condition for the program
to stop it running forever. According to different performance measures,
common choices are at “any particular time”, “after a number of events
executed”, or “when some performance measures reach some typical value”.
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One approach to simulating a PEPA model without writing the entire simulation
code, is to use the Mo¨bius [14] tool. Mo¨bius is a multi-paradigm modelling tool,
by which different formalisms can be combined to model one system. In such
way, all advantages of each formal method can be utilised in one model. PEPA
is included in those formalisms that are supported by Mo¨bius, however, it is not
the original version, but an extend version called PEPAk [12]. Three additional
items have been added to original PEPA:
• Formal Parameters: a process variable or a component now takes one or
more parameters to specify its state in the form of P [x1, · · · , xn] def= Q.
• Guards: consequent events are enabled only when the condition in the
guards has been satisfied. For example, consider an expression P [x]
def
= [x <
10] => Q, which indicates only in the condition of x less than 10, can this
local transition happen.
• Value Passing: values may now be communicated between sequential
components via activities.
Mo¨bius also supports a number of analysis methods, which include discrete event
simulation. By transferring the original PEPA to PEPAk in Mo¨bius, one can
easily run a simulation. The KDC model in Chapter 3 has been solved in Mo¨bius
by discrete event simulation, but the results are not as reliable as we expected. It
would appear that same pitfalls may exist with PEPAk under Mo¨bius, at least,
in some particular cases.
2.1.4.2 Stochastic simulation
Stochastic simulation, proposed by Gillespie [20], is a major technique for large
chemical reaction systems. Bradley et al applied this traditional technique to
PEPA models in [6]. A set of rate equations can be generated by the stoichio-
metric function from the original PEPA model, and then, solved by the Dizzy
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tool [52]. The technique was applied to a voting system modelled in PEPA, show-
ing that at least O(1010000) states are able to be solved within only a few seconds,
clearly demonstrating that it is far more efficient than CTMC based methods.
2.1.5 Stochastic Model checking
Stochastic model checking is used to check whether a stochastic model meets a
given specification. The specification is formally expressed by probabilistic tem-
poral logic, which includes Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PTCL) and
Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) for DTMC and CTMC respectively. Infor-
mally, a specification could, for example, be “the probability of a system failure
less than 10 hours is 25% ”. PEPA model checking is supported by the model
checker PRISM [38]. More recently, the CSL for PEPA model checking has been
implemented in PEPA eclipse-plugin [68] by Smith [58]. Stochastic model check-
ing is not investigated in this thesis, more background of stochastic model check-
ing can be found in [41].
2.1.6 Fluid flow analysis
ODE based fluid flow analysis is an approximate analysis technique based on
the solution of coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs), first applied to
stochastic process algebra by Hillston [34]. In this style of model analysis, the
model is expressed as a finite number of replicated components and ODEs which
represent the flow between behaviours (PEPA derivatives) of the components.
Thus, by solving the ODEs, it is possible to count the number of components
behaving as a given derivative at any given time, t. In the absence of oscillations,
the limit, t −→∞, then tends to a steady state value.
It is important to make two crucial observations about this approach. Firstly,
this is a fluid approximation, not a discrete behaviour. Therefore, we observe a
continuous evolution of a derivative, so we can, at any given time, see a fraction
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of a derivative behaving in some way, and another fraction behaving in another.
Secondly the analysis is deterministic. Thus, not only will simulating such a sys-
tem produce exactly the same results every time, but also if the rate of an action
is r, then a component will have completely evolved (or flowed) into its derivative
in exactly 1/r time units. Furthermore, ODE analysis has been shown to only
give a good prediction in certain classes of model, when there is at most one ac-
tive minimum function [65]. Despite these restrictions, the technique is extremely
useful when considering very large numbers of components. The accuracy of ODE
analysis is discussed in Section 2.1.6.6.
2.1.6.1 ODE derivation
The following general differential equation [34] can be used to generate a set of
ODEs for a system:
dN(Cij, t)
dt
= −
∑
(α,r)∈Ex(Cij)
r × min
Ckl∈Ex(α,r)
(N(Ckl, t))
+
∑
(α,r)∈En(Cij)
r × min
Ckl∈Ex(α,r)
(N(Ckl, t))
Where, Cij denotes jth local derivative of component type Ci. N(Cij, t) is the
number of Cij at time t, Ex(Cij) and En(Cij) is the set of exit activities and entry
activities of Cij respectively.
Consider our Process/Resource Model, the set of ODEs of the system can be
generated as:
d
dt
Process0(t) = r2Process1(t)−min(r1, r3)Process0(t)
d
dt
Process1(t) = min(r1, r3)Process0(t)− r2Process1(t)
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ddt
Resource0(t) = r4Resource1(t)−min(r1, r3)Resource0(t)
d
dt
Resource1(t) = min(r1, r3)Resource0(t)− r4Resource1(t)
2.1.6.2 Solution by simulation
The simplest way of solving a set of ODE is simulating over a suitably long time
frame until we observe the long run (steady state) behaviour. In doing so we need
to be careful that in discretizing time we make the time step sufficiently small so
as to not alter the system behaviour. Typically we take the time step, δt, such
that, δt ≤ 1/(rmaxN).
2.1.6.3 Analytic solution
When the system is in steady state, it is clear that the state of derivatives will
not change anymore. Hence, the left part of the set of ODEs become zero as
t −→ ∞, if a steady states solution exists. To consider our Process/Resource
model, two equations with four variables can be obtained:
r2 lim
t→∞
Process1(t)−min(r1, r3) lim
t→∞
Process0(t) = 0
min(r1, r3) lim
t→∞
Resource0(t)− r4 lim
t→∞
Resource1(t) = 0
Further more, we know the initial number of each component. For example,
we assume there are N process component and M resource component in initial
stage. Therefore:
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lim
t→∞
Process0(t) + lim
t→∞
Process1(t) = N
lim
t→∞
Resource0(t) + lim
t→∞
Resource1(t) = M
Consequently, a closed form solution can be obtained by solving four equations
with four variables.
lim
t→∞
Process0(t) =
r2
min(r1, r3) + r2
N
lim
t→∞
Process1(t) =
min(r1, r3)
min(r1, r3) + r2
N
lim
t→∞
Resource0(t) =
r4
min(r1, r3) + r4
M
lim
t→∞
Resource1(t) =
min(r1, r3)
min(r1, r3) + r4
M
2.1.6.4 Stochastic differential equations
A stochastic differential equation (SDE) based fluid flow approximation is pro-
posed by Hayden and Bradley [29, 30]. Noise is introduced to the deterministic
ODEs by recourse to a Brownian motion or thinned Poisson random measures, in
the situation that one is willing to model the influence that introduced by random
noise in a system. This type of analysis has not been utilised here. Details of the
approach, which is mathematically challenging, can be found in [29, 30, 57].
2.1.6.5 Higher moment from ODEs
Later on, Hayden and Bradley explored general-order moment analysis of fluid
approximation in [32, 31]. This approach can analyse more significant aspects
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of the models, such as variance of second moment, rather than mean value of
first moment. It also provides a path to evaluate the accuracy of the first order
analysis. Furthermore, this type of analysis can be easily conducted by the tool
GPA, which developed by Stefanek, Hayden and Bradley [60].
2.1.6.6 Accuracy of fluid approximation
As only ODE based fluid flow analysis is utilised in this thesis, we illustrate the
accuracy of ODE approximation in this section by two typical examples. Firstly,
we plot one of the results from the KDC case study in Chapter 3 following.
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Figure 2.5: Average response time calculated by the ODEs and CTMC, rq =
rB = rA = rc = 1 and ru = 1.1
One can refer to Section 3.4 for the KDC model and Section 3.5 for the ODEs.
Figure 2.5 shows the average response time of KDC server against the scale (num-
ber of clients, N)) of the system. The results from ODE approximation are very
close to CTMC results when N is extremely small, and the ODE approximation
gives accurate results when the system scale is very large. However, it is not diffi-
cult to notice that there are divergence areas for each set of results in the middle of
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the curves. The inaccurate areas can be identified, and the details are in Section
3.5. Furthermore, we can find that the small scale and large scale are determined
by the parameters in particular cases. In practice, this ODE approximation is not
applicable if one is looking for exact solution in the divergence area. However,
some of the optimistic job and trend analysis are fit for the approximation.
The KDC model in Section 3.4 only have one service type. Further inaccurate
issue has been found by Thomas in [65] with two kind of services in a model. We
use the example from [65] to shown the situation as follow.
Proc
def
= (service, µ).P roc
Disk
def
= (request, η).Disk
User1
def
= (think, ξ).User2
User2
def
= (service, pµ).User1 + (service, (1− p)µ).User3
User3
def
= (write, η).User1
System
def
= (Proc||Disk[K]) BC{service,write}User1[N ]
The system describes a processor and an array of K independent disks. Users
request a service from the processor.After this they either think for a while, before
making another request, or their results requires writing to a disk before thinking
and then another request.
Following derivation equations in Section 2.1.6.1, the ODEs can be derived as:
d
dt
User1(t) = pµmin(1, User2(t)) + ηmin(K,User3)− ξUser1(t)
d
dt
User2(t) = ξUser1(t)− µmin(1, User2(t))
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ddt
User3(t) = (1− p)µmin(1, User2(t))− ηmin(K,User3)
d
dt
Proc(t) = 0
d
dt
Disk(t) = 0
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Figure 2.6: Average queue length at processor varied with population size, ξ =
10, µ = 30, η = 5, K = 3
Clearly, there are two type of minimum functions in the ODEs. Figure 2.6 com-
pares the ODE analysis with a exact solution, mean vale analysis in terms of the
queue length at processor. When p is large (0.8), ODEs give our expected results
that it is accurate after the divergence area with large number of clients. Under
this value of p, only a few Users go to the write service at Disk, and this means
one of the queue is heavy loaded and another one is not busy. However, if we
assign the similar workloads to each server by setting p to 0.6, ODEs results do
not converge with the exact solution even when number of clients is very large.
From the investigation of ODE analysis with applications, we can initially con-
cludes that ODE method perform very well with very small scale and large scale
33
situation in cycled PEPA models with only one minimum function. If there are
more than one minimum functions in system ODEs, the method still could give
acceptable results if one of the server services most of the clients. However, the
ODE analysis is inaccurate when the servers are equally loaded.
2.1.7 Mean Value Analysis
Mean value analysis (MVA) is a method for deriving performance metrics based
on steady state averages directly from the queueing network specification, without
the need to derive any of the underlying Markov chain. As such it is relatively
computationally efficient as long as the population size is not excessively large.
2.1.7.1 A class of closed queueing networks in PEPA
Consider a model of a closed queueing network of N jobs circulating around a
network of M service stations, denoted 1, . . . ,M ; each station is either a queueing
station or an infinite server station. There are Mq queueing stations. Let M be
the set of all queueing stations. At each queueing station, i, there is an associated
queue (bounded at N) with Ki servers. The servers are able to serve jobs of only
one type; each job type, j, is served at rate rj. At each infinite server station, i,
jobs of type i experience a random delay with mean 1/ri. All services times are
negative exponentially distributed.
There are J job types. Each job type can be served at most one station. When a
job of type j completes a service at a given station, it will proceed to service at a
station (possibly the same station) as a job of type k according to some routing
probability pjk.
In PEPA a queue station can be modelled as
QStationi
def
= (servicei, ri).QStationi , ∀i ∈M
Note that ri is always specified as finite, and not >. This is because passive
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actions are subject to the apparent rate in PEPA. The infinite server stations are
not represented explicitly.
Each job will receive service from a sequence of stations determined by a set of
routing probabilities,
Jobi
def
=
J∑
k=1
(servicej, pjkrj).Jobk , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ J
Where, 0 ≤ pjk ≤ 1 and
J∑
k=1
pjk = 1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ J
Denote Si to be the set of all job types which perform servicei actions, i.e. Si = j
if servicei ∈ A(Jobj).
The entire system can then be represented as follows:( ∏
∀i∈M
(QStationi[Ki])
)
BC
L Job1[N ] (2.1)
Where
L =
⋃
∀i∈M
{servicei}
2.1.7.2 Solution
We now consider the arrival theorem, first derived independently by Sevcik and
Mitrani [55] and Lavenberg and Reiser [43], applied to this class of PEPA model.
Theorem 1 Arrival Theorem. Consider a component Jobi evolving into its
successor derivative, Jobj in a system given by (2.1). The steady state distribution
of the number of components behaving as any component Jobk at that moment
is equal to the steady state distribution of the number of components behaving as
Jobk in a system without the evolving job.
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The arrival theorem is as profound as it is simple and seemingly intuitive. It
consequently gives rise to the well known mean value analysis, whereby the av-
erage behaviour of a system of N components may be derived from the average
behaviour of a system of N − 1 components. Therefore it is never necessary to
derive a solution to the full CTMC if we are only concerned with the average
behaviour of systems of this kind. This follows from the following set of relation-
ships, derived following the pattern of Haverkort [28] pp. 241-245.
Theorem 1 implies that the average time a component spends in behaviour Jobj,
denoted Wj(N), where A(Jobj) = servicei and i ∈ M, is given by the average
number of Jobk (∀k ∈ Si) components in a system with one fewer Jobl, ∀i,
components in total. Denote Lj(N) to be the steady state average number of
components behaving as Jobj in a system with N jobs in total. If
∑
∀i∈Sj Li(N −
1) ≤ Kj − 1 and j ∈M then
Wi =
1
rj
, ∀i ∈ Sj (2.2)
Otherwise, if
∑
∀i∈Sj Li(N − 1) > Kj − 1 and j ∈M then
Wi ≈
1 +
∑
∀i∈Sj Li(N − 1)
Kjri
(2.3)
Clearly, if j /∈ ⋃∀i∈M S〉, then Wj(N) is a constant, given as Wj(N) = 1/rj. The
exact solution of equation (2.3) can be found in [67].
We now need to compute a quantity generally referred to as the visit count,
denoted Vi. The visit count is the number of times derivative Jobi is visited,
relative to the number of times some reference derivative JobI is visited, where
1 ≤ I ≤ J . The actual value of Vi is not crucial, rather its value relative to the
value of VI . As such the choice of I is strictly arbitrary.
We can compute the visit count from the routing probabilities pij. Define the
probability that a component will evolve from Jobi to Jobj, without revisiting
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Jobi, as follows:
Pij(σ) = pij +
∑
∀k/∈σ
pikPkj(σ)
The set σ here contains only the starting and ending behaviours of interest, in
this case i and j, i.e. it is used to tell us if we reach Jobj or first return to Jobi.
For convenience define the shorthand,
Pij = Pij({i, j})
By definition, Pii = 1. Clearly the system is irreducible if
Pij > 0 ∀i, j , i 6= j
Now we choose some reference point I, such that,
Vi =
PIi
PiI
, ∀i 6= I
and VI = 1. Thus, Vi gives the number of times a component assumes the
behaviour Jobi, relative to the number times it assumes the behaviour JobI .
Given the quantity Vj, we can now compute the average response time per passage
for a component behaving as Jobj.
Wˆj(N) = VjWj(N) (2.4)
From Little’s theorem we know that
Lj(N) = Xj(N)Wj(N) = X(N)VjWj(N) = X(N)Wˆj(N) (2.5)
Where Xj(N) is the observed rate of activity servicej when the population size
is N , and X(N) is the sum of all possible Xj(N)
′s.
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Summing (2.5) over all behaviours Jobi, i = 1, 2, . . . , J gives,
J∑
j=1
Lj(N) = X(N)
J∑
j=1
Wˆj(N) = X(N)Wˆ (N) = N
where Wˆ (N) =
∑J
j=1 Wˆj(N). Thus,
X(N) =
N
Wˆ (N)
Hence, with Little’s law applied for a given behaviour Jobj,
Lj(N) = Xj(N)Wj(N) = X(N)VjWj(N) =
N
Wˆ (N)
Wˆj(N) (2.6)
We are now in a position to calculate Lj(N) for any value of N if we can calculate
Lj(1). A solitary Jobi component will never compete for cooperation over the
actions in L, and so will experience a delay of 1/ri in each derivative Jobi. Hence,
the average number of components behaving as Jobj when N = 1, Lj(1) is given
by the proportion of time a component spends in that behaviour.
Lj(1) =
Vj
rj
∑J
i=1
Vi
ri
(2.7)
We now apply the following iterative solution.
1. Calculate Lj(1) for j = 1, 2, . . . J , using (2.7).
2. n = 2
3. Compute Wˆj(n) for j = 1, 2, . . . J , using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) and Lj(n−1)
from 1 above.
4. Compute Wˆ (n) =
∑J
j=1 Wˆj(n).
5. Compute Lj(n) for j = 1, 2, . . . J , using (2.6) and Wˆ (n) from 4 above.
6. Increment n.
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7. If n ≤ N return to step 3 else end.
2.1.7.3 Limitation
Clearly, the approach is limited in both the metrics that can be derived and also
the class of model that is considered. The former limitation is a feature of mean
value analysis (hence the name). However, the class of model could be extended
in a number of ways. Mean value analysis applies to multiple classes of jobs
in closed queueing network. Therefore it should be straightforward to define a
class of model with different groups of components, each with potentially different
action rates and routing probabilities. This would be a relatively simple extension
of the current class, but would involve careful use of notation to distinguish classes
in a meaningful way.
Moreover, it should be noted that there can only be one service action type at a
station and that must be given the same rate in any job type where it is enabled.
Although intuitively it is possible to model the case where there are more job
types enabled at a queueing station, doing so potential introduces race conditions
and therefore distorts the effective service rate. We are still considering how
such a situation might be best specified and it may be more feasible to consider
approximate solutions in this scenario.
2.2 Related work
In this section, various related papers has been reviewed. All these papers explore
the performance of security mechanisms, or timing properties of security systems
more generally. According to the analysis methods, we classify those papers to
informal, which includes performance measurement and computer based simula-
tion, and formal modelling, which are mathematical based modelling techniques.
We focus on the latter part.
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2.2.1 Informal analysis
Argyroudis et al [1] established a test bed upon an HP mobile device to mea-
sure three commonly used security protocols: SSL, S/MIME and IPsec. By
employing different key length and different scenarios, the results show that it is
not a obstacle to apply strong cryptographic protocols on handheld devices. This
paper only studied the three types of security protocols individually, still stick
on SSL and S/MIME, Gutmann [22] conducts a comparison between these two
protocols and those with similar functions protocols: PGP and SSH. SSL and
PGP are both secure messaging protocols, and S/MIME amd SSH are both
secure communication protocols. In contrast to Argyroudis et al [1], Gutmann
[22] measured the performance the protocols upon a normal PC and investigated
more thoroughly and detailed in terms of the overhead analysis. In addition,
these protocols also have been compared in low-powered devices. The results
form a reference for performance and security engineers to choose one of these
protocols in the relevant environment. In [16], Dick and Thomas only focus on
the PGP protocol. Based on four different hardwares, two versions of PGP
have been explored. They studied the overhead which is introduced by different
encryption/decryption algorithms and different key lengths.
Potlapally et al [50] investigated another element of performance, energy con-
sumption, over the SSL protocol. The experiments have been set on a client-
server environment which consists of a mobile device as a client equipped a wire-
less access point to the LAN and a PC as a server that is wired to the LAN.
Different ciphers and hash algorithms with SSL have been tested and compared
for the energy loss. Further more, the authors analysed the trade-off between
energy consumption and security for this protocol.
Rodeh et al [54] studied security protocols that have been applied to ensemble
group communication system. They measured the latency of an ensemble stack
which is defined as being the period from message arrival to message departure,
and this delay also has been compared in two machines with different CPUs.
Moreover, timing property of rekey actions has been measured as this action
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potentially affects the trade-off between security and performance.
Moralis et al [47] compared X.509 standard and the Kerberos protocol in a web
services environment. By setting up a test bed, delay of requests in different stages
have been measured in the scenario of heavy load with different message size and
fix message size with different loads. The results show that either mechanism
could perform better in appropriate conditions. Still considering the security of
web services, Lamprecht et al [42] measured encryption/decryption time of differ-
ent implementations of different encryption algorithms in the scenario of secure
transaction in web services environment. Chromiak and Lojewshi studied similar
research issue in [10], in which they only focus on JCE/JCA with Bouncy Cas-
tle provider but covered more algorithms. They then measured the time taking
of every stage in encryption/decryption process. These commonly used crypto-
graphic algorithms have also been investigated and measured by Freeman and
Miller with different processors in [19]. Furthermore, to consider performance-
critical systems, the authors analysed the security-performance trade-off in case
of best security/worst performance, good performance/good security and good
security/fast performance.
Zhao evaluated the BGP protocol in her PHD thesis [70] by using a Java-based
discrete event simulator SSFNet. She analysed detailed performance issues of
BGP and its extension Secure-BGP, and those performance issues have been illus-
trated numerically. Additionally, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been eval-
uated, and analysed how this infrastructure affect security of BGP. In [56] Sha et
al simulated an access control protocol ALOHA and its extension ALOHA/PCD.
By comparing the packet delay and channel throughput under the same condi-
tions, the results show that ALOHA/PCD performs much better than its older
version.
Although informal analysis could be applied to any type of system in any situa-
tion, all the experiment results do not show the underlying reason of the latency
and that could be realised by formal analysis.
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2.2.2 Formal analysis
Cho et al [9] investigated the potential attack in Dynamic Group Communica-
tion system (DGCs) to explore how the different rekeying methods affect both
security and performance of the whole system, and optimised those methods with
appropriate parameters. Based on Stochastic Petri-Net (SPN), the model of three
rekeying protocols in DGCs have been established in the environment of Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks, and the results clearly show the optimisation point. However,
the largest number of requests in the experiments is eight, and that is far less
than a real case. The authors also have not provided the analysis techniques or
tools for readers to establish more confidence of the results.
Wang et al [69] formulated a queueing model for three types of attack on email
systems. To address the trade-off of security and performance, not only the per-
formance metric, average queue length, is obtained, but also metrics of depend-
ability, system availability and information leakage probability, are calculated.
In the context, the queueing model represents a quasi-birth-death Markovian
process, and can be analytically solved efficiently. Nevertheless, the computation
effort apparently becomes very significant if a large number of agents are involved
in the system.
El-Hadidi et al [17] evaluated performance of the Kerberos protocol in an dis-
tributed environment. A basic scenario of Kerberos protocol has been modeled
by queueing network, and the queueing model has been analytically solved to ob-
tain average time for transferring a message between a client and a server. Later
on, the authors extended the paper by comparing the performance of the Kerberos
protocol to two other authentication protocols: authenticated Diffie-Hellman ex-
change protocol and HAH protocol in [18]. Again, the authors formulated queue-
ing models for all three authentication protocol and solved them analytically.
By comparing the average messaging time, the results show that the Kerberos
protocol has the best performance in terms of the speed, nevertheless, the HAH
protocol is the best protocol by considering the trade-off between security and
performance. There are two drawbacks in these two papers: firstly, the authors
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did not investigate the case of multi-realms in the Kerberos protocol, which could
cause more traffic issues; secondly, the analytical solution may be frustrated if the
system is large enough. Those issues have been considered in [23] by Harbitter
and Menasce. the Kerberos protocol has been investigated more thoroughly with
three inner-mechanism in multi-realms scenario. Again, queueing network tech-
niques have been employed to model the systems, however, rather than analytical
solution, the authors applied mean value analysis (MVA). MVA is only able to
obtain mean values, but avoids generating the entire state space, and so is a very
efficient analysis technique. The results of MVA have been compared with those
obtained from measurement.
Liu et al [44] studied an authentication protocol, and derived a queueing model,
which represents a quasi-birth-death Markovian process. By applying RG factor-
ization, the authors efficiently solved the queueing model analytically to obtain
the state space distribution. Performance metrics then have been calculated and
analysed. To some extent, this analysis method is efficient, however, it is not
difficult to find that the equations of the analytical solution may take a long time
to solve, or even terminated in some point because of limited memory.
Bodei et al [3] proposed a new method for performance evaluation of security
protocols based on LySa. LySa is a process algebra used for analysing security
properties of security protocols, however, authors assigned rates to enhanced la-
bels of the transitions of the system to transform to a Markov chain, which has
been utilised for performance analysis. Under this way, a security protocol is able
to be investigated for both security and performance property to realise trade-off
analysis, and the method has been illustrated by an example, the Otway-Rees
protocol. The transformed Markov chain of the Otway-Rees protocol has been
analytical solved to obtain the steady state distribution. However, it is difficult to
fit a particular scenario from this performance aspect and is infeasible to analyse
a security protocol under a large scale environment. A way of scalable trade-off
analysis has been proposed in [7]. Based on a study of timing attack, Buch-
holtz et al studied both security and performance aspects of a security protocol,
the Wide-Mouthed Frog (WMF ). Rather than transform the security model
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to a Markov chain, the authors extracted both security and performance model
from a UML diagram. Again, the security model is specified by LySa, however,
the performance model is specified by PEPA (Performance Evaluation Process
Algebra). One could modify this PEPA model to fit any scenario to conduct
performance analysis. The authors recommended a tool chain IPC/DNAmaca
as a PEPA analyser, that not only can be used for steady state analysis, but also
can obtain passage-time distribution. Further more, IPC/DNAmaca is able to
solve large scale PEPA models.
Thomas [64] conducted a peformability study of a secure e-voting system. The
model is formulated by a stochastic process algebra PEPA. Along with more
distributed voters coming to the system, the model encountered the state space
explosion problem. Two simplification methods were proposed. Firstly, the au-
thor aggregated some internal actions to reduce the state space. Secondly, a
queue-based approximation is derived. By comparing the state space of the orig-
inal model and both approximations, the queue-based approximation model was
more scalable than aggregation, however, the aggregation method was more ac-
curate.
Bradley et al [5] explored three types of Internet worm attack based on a PEPA
model. To consider scalable analysis, fluid flow approximation (based on ordi-
nary differential equations) is employed to analyse the PEPA models. This kind
of analysis approximates the original discrete state space into continuous states,
and it is able to cope with model of 1010000 states and beyond. The authors inves-
tigated number of infected machines, network connections, susceptible machines
and changes over time with different network capacity and patch rate under these
three types of Internet worm attack. However, these results have not been verified
by observation.
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2.3 Summary
This chapter describes the PEPA language and some of the current efficient so-
lutions for PEPA models that we employed or attempted to employ in this work,
and some related case studies.
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Chapter 3
Key Distribution Centre
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies a secure symmetric key exchange protocol, which utilises
a trusted third party known as a key distribution centre (KDC), first proposed
by Needham and Schroeder [48]. Firstly, three versions of the model have been
specified and analyzed numerically, but, in doing so, we encountered the state
space explosion problem. The remainder of this chapter explores possible ap-
proaches to solving and evaluating a utility function, based on those techniques,
to better understand the behaviour of this system. The contributions of this
Chapter includes the development of partial evaluation, identification of diverge
point (N∗) in ODE approximation, and identification of ODE analysis is the same
as asymptotic bounds of the equivalent closed queueing model.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section (Section 3.2) we introduce
the system to be modelled, the key distribution centre and a utility function used
to evaluate its behaviour. This is followed by three proposed modelling choices
with preliminary numerical results. Section 3.4 introduces the chosen modelling
form, followed by a simplified (equivalent) version and an approximation. Some
numerical results of the approximation are presented, including comparison of
the approximation results with discrete event simulation. After that, a simple
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fluid analysis based on ordinary differential equations is introduced in Section
3.5, along with numerical results which are compared with both the earlier ap-
proximation and stochastic simulation. The utility function and its numerical
results analysis are illustrated in Section 3.6. Finally we will end with a brief
summary of this chapter in Section 3.7.
3.2 Protocol specification
We now describe the specific problem we seek to model. The protocol is illustrated
in Figure 3.1 below, following the descriptions in [59] and [11].
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Figure 3.1: Key Distribution Scenario.
Additionally:
• Alice and KDC share a key KA
• Bob and KDC share a key KB
Informally we can describe the protocol as follows.
1. Alice sends a request to the KDC.
2. If Alice is known and trusted by the KDC, it responds with an encrypted
message only Alice can read, which includes a session key for Alice and Bob
to use and a further encrypted message only Bob can read.
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3. Alice will then forward part of the message from the KDC directly to Bob.
4. Bob will decrypt this message (as he knows the decryption key) and re-
sponds to Alice with some random data (called a nonce) encrypted with
the session key.
5. Alice will confirm the use of the session key by replying to Bob with a
modification of the nonce, encrypted with the session key.
The key features of this protocol are that only Alice can read the message sent
by the KDC (step 2) as only Alice and the KDC know the key KA. Included
in this message is another message further encrypted with KB, the key shared
by Bob and the KDC. Alice cannot read this message, but instead forwards it to
Bob (step 3). This message tells Bob that Alice is genuine (i.e. has communicated
with the KDC and displays a correct ID) and informs Bob of the session key; only
Bob can read this message. Alice and Bob now both know the session key KS
and the remainder of the protocol ensures that Bob trusts Alice and the session
key (and Alice trusts Bob).
More formally we can define the protocol as follows [11].
1. Alice −→ KDC : A,B,N1
2. KDC −→ Alice : {KS, A,B,N1{KS, IDA}KB}KA
3. Alice −→ Bob : {KS, IDA}KB
4. Bob −→ Alice : {N2}KS
5. Alice −→ Bob : {f(N2)}KS
where,
• X −→ Y denotes a communication from X to Y .
• x1, . . . xn denotes a tuple of n values.
48
• {x1, . . . xn}K denotes a tuple of n values encrypted with the key K.
• N1 and N2 are nonces (random items of data).
• IDA is a unique identifier for Alice.
• f(N) denotes a predefined function applied to the nonce N .
The performance of the protocol use is dominated by competition for resources at
the KDC. Thus, when a client (Alice) contacts the KDC to obtain a session key,
the request will be queued awaiting service and processed along with other waiting
requests according to some scheduling strategy. We assume that this strategy is
FCFS, and hence the service of any incoming request will be dependent on the
service of all other requests already present in the system, the rate at which
requests can be serviced, rp, and the number of servers available, K.
We now wish to explore two closely related questions: “how many clients can
a given KDC configuration support?” and “how much service capacity must we
provide at a KDC to satisfy a given number of clients?” In the first instance we
would fix K and rp and find the largest value of the population size, N , before
the performance begins to significantly degrade. In the latter case we would fix
N and rp and find an optimal value of K. In addition to these two cases, we may
also ask, given a demand (from N client pairs with use rate ru and request rate
rq) on a given system (of K servers running at rate rp), what is the maximum rate
at which keys can be refreshed before the KDC performance begins to degrade?
In answering these questions we need to consider what we mean by the perfor-
mance of the KDC. In the solution of this model we will introduce a number of
performance measures, including utilisation, throughput, average queue length
and average response time. All of these measures are important, but considering
all of them at once will not lead to a clear picture of optimal performance. Instead
we introduce a utility function to be optimised. This function is based on the
assumption that there is a cost in keeping customers waiting (as the longer they
wait, the less they will be satisfied) and a competing cost in providing resources
at the KDC (e.g. purchasing and maintaining or leasing servers).
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This gives rise to the following simple utility function.
C = c1L+ c2Krp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (3.1)
Where L is the mean queue length at the KDC. The cost rates c1 and c2 are
dependent on the particular system in question and may further depend on the
type of quality of service contract that is in place with customers. If we wish to
improve the responsiveness of the system, we would increase c1, whereas if we
want to minimise running costs we would increase c2.
3.3 Modelling Choices
There are three approaches that we have developed to model this secure key
distribution scenario for multiple clients. First, we consider Alice and Bob as
a pair of clients, and repeated this pair in the model to communicate with key
distribution centre to specify multiple clients, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. In this
model, a response from the KDC must succeed the request behaviour of each
corresponding Alice, and precede any other interaction.
In PEPA this model can be modelled as follows:
KDC
def
= (request,>).(response, rp).KDC;
Alice
def
= (request, rq).(response,>).(sendBob, rB).
(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).Alice;
Bob
def
= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).(usekey,>).Bob;
System
def
= KDC BCL (AliceBCK Bob)[N ]
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Figure 3.2: Initial model of key distribution centre.
where L = {request, reponse},K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}, N
is number of pairs of clients.
The second model has been approached in a different way. In this approach,
multiple clients were manually added by different names and parallel request and
response are allowed here, this means that the KDC can receive (and queue)
several request before responding to them, as shown in Figure 3.3.
This approach can be modelled in PEPA as follows (φ in this model is the number
of pairs of clients):
KDC
def
= (requestA,>).KDC1
+ (requestC,>).KDC2
+ · · ·
+ (requestA(2φ−2),>).KDCφ;
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Figure 3.3: Alternative model of key distribution centre.
KDC1
def
= (responseA, rp).KDC + (requestC,>).KDC(φ+1)
+ (requestE,>).KDC(φ+2)
+ · · ·
+ (requestA(2φ−2),>).KDC(2φ−1);
· · ·
A
def
= (requestA, rq).(responseA,>).(sendB, rB).(sendA,>).
(confirmA, rc).(usekeyA, ru).A;
B
def
= (sendB,>).(sendA, rA).(confirmA,>).(usekeyA,>).B;
· · ·
A(2φ−2)
def
= (requestA(2φ−2), rq).(responseA(2φ−2),>).
(sendA(2φ−1), rA(2φ−1)).(sendA(2φ−2),>).
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(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).A(2φ−2);
A(2φ−1)
def
= (sendA(2φ−1),>).(sendA(2φ−2), rA(2φ−2)).
(confirm,>).(usekey,>).A(2φ−1);
System
def
= KDC BCL ((ABCK B)|| · · · ||(A(2φ−2) BCZ A(2φ−1))
where L = {requestA, responseA, · · · , requestA(2φ−2), responseA(2φ−2)}, K =
{sendB, sendA, confirmA, usekeyA}, Z = {sendA(2φ−1), sendA(2φ−2),
confirm(φ−1), usekey(φ−1)}.
The third approach uses the same infrastructure as model one (Figure 3.2). The
two main differences are that model three makes requests and responses in par-
allel, so the KDC can hold several requests in a queue, as in model two; and an
anonymous response mechanism is introduced here, that means KDC does not
explicitly distinguish between requests.
PEPA model for third approach as follows: (φ in this model means number of
pair of clients)
KDC
def
= (request,>).KDC1;
KDC1
def
= (response, rp).KDC + (request.>).KDC2;
KDC2
def
= (response, rp).KDC1 + (request,>).KDC3;
KDC3
def
= (response, rp).KDC2 + (request,>).KDC4;
· · ·
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KDCφ
def
= (response, rp).KDC(φ−1);
Alice
def
= (request, rq).(response,>).(sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).
(confirm, rc).(usekey, ru).Alice;
Bob
def
= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).(usekey,>).Bob;
System
def
= KDC BCL (AliceBCK Bob)[N ]
where L = {request, reponse},K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}, N
is number of pair of clients.
3.3.1 Preliminary results
The three models of key distribution are now compared numerically using the
PEPA Workbench [13]. In all cases the parameters are set to 1.0 (except ru=1.1
for numerical computation reasons) and other parameters are varied as shown.
Three experiments have been set up for each model to test the utilisation of the
KDC, i.e. the state of the KDC holding at least one request. First, we increased
number of clients to the limit of the PEPA Workbench. Then we varied the rate
of usekey (ru) in case of three pair of clients in second experiment. Finally, rate
of request (rq) has been varied in case of three pair of clients for testing.
In the first experiment, a “run out of memory java heap space” occurs when the
number of pairs exceeds five. Therefore, five data points were acquired for each
model in the first trial. Figure 3.4 shows the KDC utilisation as the number of
client pairs is increased. We see that for all three models, utilisation increases
when adding more clients to the model, as expected. The reason is clearly that as
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Figure 3.4: Utilisation of the KDC varied with number of client pairs.
more clients are involved, more requests will be made, thus, the KDC has more
work to do.
The second feature that can be observed in Figure 3.4 is that the utilisation of the
KDC in model 1 increases slower and is smaller at any point (except the start)
than for model 2 and model 3. In the case of one pair of clients, the three models
gave exactly the same result, as we would expect. In model 1, the response of the
KDC must succeed a request behaviour of each corresponding Alice. As such, the
KDC cannot hold multiple requests at the same time. Thus, subsequent requests
are blocked until the KDC is idle when the request can be made. In the case of
models 2 and 3, requests are queued so that once one request has been processed,
another service may begin immediately. Thus, the system described by model 1
is therefore clearly less efficient.
Another aspect shown in Figure 3.4 is that model 2 and model 3 have exactly the
same results. The only difference between model 2 and model 3 is in distinguish-
ing which client pair are being responded to. In model 3 the KDC component
merely keeps track of the number of waiting clients, whereas in model 2 each
client is distinguished by name and action. This means that more information
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is potentially available in model 2, although in practice this does not change the
amount of work the KDC has to undertake, so the utilisation is the same in each
case.
Figure 3.5 shows the result of the second experiment.
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Figure 3.5: KDC utilisation varied with rate of use of the key.
For the reason discussed above, model 2 and model 3 have the same result in
this experiment as well. The utilisation of the KDC in model 1 is again smaller
than in model 2 and model 3 in any same rate of key use. There are some new
features here in experiment two: first, the utilisation of the KDC increases when
ru is increased; secondly, the utilisation of the KDC in all models increases more
slowly as ru gets larger; finally, all three models keep the same increasing rate.
For the first feature, the reason is that increasing ru leads to clients sending
requests to the KDC more frequently. Therefore, the KDC has more requests to
process. The profile of the plots is a direct result of the variation of ru, which is
the reciprocal of the duration of the key use. When ru is small, a small increase
has a large effect (a large decrease in usekey duration), however obviously the
same increase has a much smaller effect when ru is large (duration is very short,
and the decrease is minimal).
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Figure 3.6: KDC utilisation varied against the rate of request.
Finally, we come to the third experiment show in Figure 3.6. We again found
two features are the same as discussed in experiments one and two, namely, that
model 2 and model 3 have the same result in this experiment, and the utilisation
of the KDC in model 1 is smaller than in model 2 and model 3 for any given rate
of request. The differences from other experimental results are that utilisation of
the KDC increases as rq increases. Clearly, the faster the clients request, more
likely that the KDC is busy. Another characteristic of these results is that the
utilisation of the KDC in all models increases more slowly as rq gets larger. The
reason is similar as changing ru in experiment two. The time for a client pair to
cycle through their states is given as Tk +
1
rq
+ 1
ru
, thus increasing of rq makes
1
rq
smaller every time, although the increasing part is getting smaller every time as
well. Finally, we found that utilisation of the KDC in model 1 is getting close
to that in model 2 and model 3. With rq increasing, the time that the KDC
has to wait between requests in model 1 is getting smaller, which makes model 1
closer to model 2 and model 3 where there is no such waiting as the requests are
queued. Clearly as ru → ∞ the different calculations of utilisation will converge.
As well as the utilisation of the key distribution centre, we would also wish to
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measure the performance perceived by the user. To do this we calculate the
average response time, which we define as the time from when the previous session
key has finished being used, to the time when the new session key was started to
be used. The average response time, W, is calculated as follows:
W =
1− puse
puseruse
(3.2)
Where puse is the steady state probability that a given key is being used by a
given communicating pair. Because all the models are symmetric with respect to
communicating pairs, it does not matter which component we choose to measure
to find puse. The reason that response time is defined in this way, and not as more
conventionally to be just the time taken by the server, is that model 1 includes
blocking of requests when busy. This is a clear performance difference between
model 1 and the other two approaches and therefore needs to be incorporated in
the metric to get a consistent comparison.
The same three experiments we conducted as above, and calculated average re-
sponse time by (3.2). Figure 3.7 shows the response time varied as number of
clients pair is increased.
Again, we found Model 2 and Model 3 have exactly the same results and all
three models become the same in the case of one pair of client, for the same
reasons that have been discussed above. Here, for all three models, response time
increases when adding more clients to the system. It is clear that more clients
involved in, the system takes more time to respond in average. Another feature
is that average response time in Model 1 is larger than in Model 2 and Model 3
in any case of same number of pairs of clients (except one). There are two parts
involved in our defined response time: request time and service time. All models
have the same request time in this experiment. But, for Model 2 and Model 3,
system need less time to process all jobs as requests are queued at the KDC rather
than requests being blocked until the previous one has finished being processed
in Model 1. Therefore, Model 1 shows less efficient results.
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Figure 3.7: Response time varied with number of client pairs.
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Figure 3.8: Response time varied with rate of use of the key.
Figure 3.8 shows the results of varying the rate of usekey (ru) in case of three
pair of clients. Response time becomes larger as the rate of usekey is increased;
then, average response time in all models increased more slowly as ru gets larger;
finally, all three models almost keep the same increasing rate. Two parts are
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involved in our defined response time: request time and service time. Request
time is stable in this experiment. Increasing rate of usekey leads to requests to
the KDC more frequently, this increasing waiting time. Thus, increasing average
waiting time is the reason for average response time getting larger here. For the
second feature, the average waiting time for one in n requests is that n−1
nrs
(rs is
service rate of KDC), which equal to 1
rs
− 1
nrs
. The increasing part is getting
smaller when more requests waiting. There is no changing influence fundamental
differences among these three models, the results keep almost the same increasing
rate consequently.
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Figure 3.9: Response time varied against the rate of request.
The results of last experiment were showed in Figure 3.9. The difference here
is that average response time for all three models decreased when rq increases.
Again, request time and service time are the two parts which influence response
time. Request time ( 1
rq
) decreasing here has more effect than increasing of service
time, for which influences the decreasing average response time. Another charac-
teristic of these curves is that average response time in all models decreases more
slowly when rq is larger.
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3.4 The Model
To consider the three modelling approaches, Model 1 is obviously less desirable
according to the results. In addition, the request action in the KDC only allows
customers start to enter the queue after the previous client has been served,
which does not capture reality and is not efficient. In Model 2 we introduced the
possibility that the KDC is serving multiple requests from multiple Alices. Each
Alice still only makes one request at a time and each request is served by the KDC
(we are not overly concerned here about the order of service). Note that due to the
semantics of the specification events occur sequentially and not simultaneously.
In addition we do not allow batched requests. It is worth observing here that
Model 2 is cumbersome to specify; if we want to consider an extra client then
we not only need to specify new Alice and Bob components, but also the KDC
component needs to be modified to incorporate the additional behaviours. Model
2 also suffers from the commonly encountered state space explosion problem. For
each Alice (and corresponding Bob) the state space is multiplied by another 6
behaviours, hence the state space is 6N , where N is the number of client pairs
(Alice+Bob).With N = 9 the state space has already grown to over 1 million
states; if N is only 5, the solution still involves (very sparce) matrices with over
60 million elements. Even the best distributed Markov chain solvers generally
only tackle state spaces of a few million states at most. Therefore, Model 3 is the
most efficient modelling form of these three approaches.
3.4.1 Model simplification and approximation
Although Model 3 is relatively efficient, the state space explosion still exists.
Although not as bad as Model 2, the KDC state in Model 3 still needs to be
modified when one wants to add a new client to the system. To counter this,
and to make the model easier to specify and understand, some simplification
techniques have been applied to derive a form of the model which gives the same
results for the key steady state metrics. This approach is based on the concept
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known as bisimulation; whereby two models may be said to be equivalent if any
sequence of actions that is possible in one model, has an equivalent sequence of
actions (at the same rate) in the other model (strong bisimulation requires that
equivalent actions have the same name, which is not the case here). This leads
us to an alternative representation of the model as follows (Model 4).
KDC
def
= (request,>).KDC + (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def
= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice′
Alice′ def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).Alice′′
Alice′′ def= (usekey, ru).Alice
Bob
def
= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).Bob′
Bob′ def= (usekey,>).Bob
System
def
= KDC BCL
(
AliceBCK Bob
)
[N ]
Where, L = {request, response}, K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey},
N is number of pair of clients.
Clearly the component Bob is almost redundant, and the sharing of the action
request and its enabling in the KDC component has no effect on the behaviour of
the model. Hence an even simpler equivalent specification would be (Model 5):
(this process has been termed partial evaluation in [11])
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KDC
def
= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def
= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice′
Alice′ def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm, rc).Alice′′
Alice′′ def= (usekey, ru).Alice
System
def
= KDC BC
response
Alice[N ]
Where N is number of Alices.
This model and the preceding one are clearly isomorphic, i.e. they have equiv-
alent CTMCs with a one-to-one mapping between states and transitions. We
can now apply the well known approximation technique of combining successive
internal actions into a single action with a modified rate. This is equivalent to
lumping states in the underlying Markov chain (Hillston [33] introduced the weak
isomorphism equivalence for exactly this purpose). Thus we obtain the following
simple form of the model (Model 6).
KDC
def
= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def
= (response,>).(τ, rx).Alice
System
def
= KDC BC
response
(Alice|| . . . ||Alice)
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Where rx is given by
rx =
(
1
rq
+
1
rB
+
1
rA
+
1
rc
+
1
ru
)−1
Model 6 is equivalent to a simple closed queueing system with one queueing
station (the KDC) and an exponential delay after service before returning to the
queue. It is a simple matter to write down the balance equations for such a
system.
rppii = (N + 1− i)rxpii−1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
where pii is the steady state probability that there are exactly i jobs waiting for
a response from the KDC and N is the number of pairs of clients (the number of
instances of Alice in the above PEPA model specification). Thus it is possible to
derive expressions for the average utilisation of the KDC and the average number
of requests waiting for a response.
U = 1−
[
N !
N∑
i=0
ρi
(N − i)!
]−1
and,
L = N !(1− U)
N∑
i=1
ρii
(N − i)!
where ρ = rx/rp.
This approximation is, in fact, an M/M/1/./N queue and the throughput and av-
erage response time are easily computed from the above expressions (see Mitrani
[46] pages 195-197).
T = (N − L)rx
and
W =
N
T
− 1
rx
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3.4.2 Numerical results
This approximation is now compared with simulation results for the full model.
The simulation was written in Java using the roulette wheel approach. The
simulation has been verified numerically against the PEPA model using the PEPA
Workbench Eclipse Plug-in [68] for small numbers of clients (N ≤ 6). The PEPA
Workbench will not give results for larger models due to problems with performing
computations on the large matrices involved, hence the need for the simulation.
Initially in the experiments which follow, the parameters are set to 1.0 (except
ru=1.1 for numerical computation reasons in the PEPA Workbench) and other
parameters are varied as shown.
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Figure 3.10: Average utilisation varied against the number of client pairs. ru =
1.1, rA = rB = rc = rq = 1.
In Figure 3.10 we show the utilisation (of the KDC) varied against the numbers
of client pairs for both the simulation and the approximation for various values
of rp. Increasing the value of rp in this way is equivalent to replacing the KDC
with a faster server. In Figure 3.11 we show the average response time (average
waiting time plus average service time) of the KDC for the same systems. Clearly,
for both metrics, there is a very close match between the simulation and the
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approximation. Hence, in Figures 3.12 and 3.13, we show the percentage error,
given as (approximation-simulation)/simulation, for both metrics to provide a
greater insight into the accuracy of the approximation. This shows that the
approximation and simulation agree to within 2% for the utilisation and within
4% for average response time. In all cases the simulation is run to a terminating
condition of a 95% confidence interval. Not surprisingly this becomes increasingly
more difficult to attain as N increases, hence the run-time increases with N .
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Figure 3.11: Average response time varied against the number of client pairs.
ru = 1.1, rA = rB = rc = rq = 1.
The most significant difference between the simulation and the approximation is
the time it takes to derive results. The simulation took several weeks to code
and each run takes in excess of 10 hours (we are not claiming this to be the most
efficient simulation possible) whereas the approximation was coded into MS Excel
in less than half an hour and results are almost instantaneous. It is worth noting
that these metrics are based on long run averages, which we would expect the
approximation to be fairly accurate in predicting, particularly utilisation. If the
measure of interest was a transient measure then the lumping of states might not
give such an accurate picture. Furthermore, if we wished to predict the end to
end performance of the protocol, i.e. from request to confirm, then we would need
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Figure 3.12: Relative error in utilisation of approximation compared to simula-
tion. ru = 1.1, rA = rB = rc = rq = 1.
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Figure 3.13: Relative error in average response time of approximation compared
to simulation. ru = 1.1, rA = rB = rc = rq = 1.
to perform a slightly different approximation which separates the usekey action
from the other lumped actions.
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The results show that there is obviously a benefit from increasing the server speed
at the KDC, but the increase in server speed is not necessarily exactly propor-
tional to the increase in capacity. For example, if we have a target maximum
utilisation of 0.65, then with rp = 1 the KDC can cope with at most 4 client
pairs. If we increase the server rate to rp = 3 then the capacity is 10 client pairs,
not 12 as we might intuitively expect. However, if we specify the maximum av-
erage response time to be 2, then rp = 1 gives the capacity as 4, rp = 2 gives 12,
and rp = 3 gives the capacity as 18 client pairs. Clearly in this case the increase
in server speed from rp = 1 to rp = 2, or rp = 3, has a significantly greater impact
on the client capacity than we might expect. Note also that, whilst intuitively
we may consider that it is possible that a greater impact could be made by con-
sidering multiple KDC severs, we know (from well established queueing theory
results) that for a simple M/M/k queue it is preferable to have one fast server
than two of half the speed. Clearly therefore we would rather double the speed
of the processor, than double the number of processors at the KDC (although
doing both would clearly be beneficial).
In the above experiments the duration for which the session key is used is set to
be approximately the same as the durations for any other action. We have done
this so that we can explore the behaviour of the KDC when it is heavily loaded,
despite only having a small number of client pairs. Clearly this is not a practical
scenario and having established the accuracy of the approximation we can now
go on to consider larger systems with a greater duration of the use of the session
key.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the utilisation and average response time for various
values of ru and rp when N = 150. When the use rate is low (ru = 0.01)
the performance is good for rp > 2 (in fact the response time for rp = 2 is
more than five times that of rp = 5, although this is not clear in the graph).
However, increasing the use rate has a dramatic effect on both the utilisation
and the average response time. The systems rapidly become saturated, except
rp = 5 (and to a lesser extent rp = 4) which grows more gently. At ru = 0.05
all the systems are saturated (100% utilisation). A similar picture is evident
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Figure 3.14: Average utilisation varied against the rate of session key use, ru.
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Figure 3.15: Average Response time varied against the rate of session key use,
ru. rq = rA = rB = rc = 1, N = 150.
for the average response time. For rp = 5 the average response time increases
exponentially. However, for rp = 1, where the response time is obviously much
greater, the increase is inversely exponential, i.e. the rate of increase decreases as
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ru increases. This is because rp = 1 is already saturated at ru = 0.01 and so a
large number of clients are already spending a long time in the queue awaiting
a response from the KDC. Hence, decreasing the time they use the session key
does not greatly change their overall behaviour (which is already dominated by
queueing). The other cases of 1 < ru < 5 fall between these extremes, with the
saturation point being clearly evident in the plot of the average response time.
3.5 Fluid analysis
Thus far we have considered a traditional approach to modelling and analysis. In
this section we consider an alternative approach proposed by Hillston [34], based
on the solution of ordinary differential equations. In this style of analysis, the
model is expressed as a number of replicated components and the ODEs represent
the flow between behaviours (PEPA derivatives) of the components. Thus, by
solving the ODEs, it is possible to ‘count’ the number of components behaving as
a given derivative at any given time, t. In the absence of oscillations, the limit,
t −→∞, then gives a steady state value.
Rewriting model slightly, removing redundancy and naming each derivative of
Alice (for clarity) we get:
KDC
def
= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def
= (request, rq).Alice1
Alice1
def
= (response, rp).Alice2
Alice2
def
= (sendBob, rB).Alice3
Alice3
def
= (sendAlice, rA).Alice4
Alice4
def
= (confirm, rc).Alice5
Alice5
def
= (usekey, ru).Alice
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The system is then defined as:
KDC[K] BC
response
Alice[N ]
Where, K is the number of KDC’s (hitherto K = 1) and N is the number of
client pairs (Alices’s). It is then a simple matter to write down the ODEs for this
system as follows.
d
dt
Alice(t) = ruAlice5(t)− rqAlice(t)
d
dt
Alice1(t) = rqAlice(t)− rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t))
d
dt
Alice2(t) = rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t))− rBAlice2(t)
d
dt
Alice3(t) = rBAlice2(t)− rAAlice3(t)
d
dt
Alice4(t) = rAAlice3(t)− rcAlice4(t)
d
dt
Alice5(t) = rcAlice4(t)− ruAlice5(t)
d
dt
KDC(t) = 0
In our analysis we are interested primarily in the number of client pairs await-
ing a response from the KDC (or KDC’s). This is represented in the model by
the number of Alice1’s; L(N) = Alice1(t −→ ∞) when there are N client pairs
(Alice’s) in the population. From this we can derive the average response time
which can be compared with that derived from the queueing network approxima-
tion. We compute the average response time for a system of N client pairs and
one KDC server (K = 1), W(N), as follows;
W (N) =
L(N − 1) + 1
rp
This computation is based on the queueing theory result of an arrival as random
observer, see Mitrani [46] page 141 for example. For K > 1 the computation is
only slightly more complex. If the random observer sees a free server, then the
average response time will be the average service time. However, if the random
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observer sees all the servers busy, then the average response time will be the
average service time plus the time it takes for one server to become available
(including scheduling the other jobs waiting ahead of the random observer).
W (N) =
1
rp
, L(N − 1) + 1 ≤ K
W (N) =
1
rp
+
L(N − 1) + 1−K
Krp
=
L(N − 1) + 1
Krp
, L(N − 1) + 1 > K
It is a feature of the fluid flow approximation that (for t > 0) the KDC will never
be idle, but instead will always have some fluid flowing through it. As such we are
unable to compute the utilisation of the KDC directly. This is clearly a limitation
of this form of analysis.
3.5.1 Numerical results of ODEs
Figure 3.16 shows the evolution over time of the number of clients awaiting a
response as derived from the ODE analysis. Initially all the clients are behaving
as Alice, hence Alice1(0) = 0. Shortly after the start there is a large influx of
fluid into Alice1 before the system settles into a stable flow. Interestingly this
initial surge is much more pronounced when rp = 4 than rp = 1. This is due to
the fact that the flow out of Alice1 is much greater when rp = 4.
Figure 3.17 shows the average response time calculated by the ODE method,
compared with the queueing approximation described earlier. This approximation
has previously been compared with simulation and shown to be accurate to within
the 95% confidence interval of the simulation in Section 3.4.2.
We expect the ODE method to be accurate when N is large. Figure 3.17 shows
that it is possible to generate accurate results even when N is quite small. How-
ever, there is a clear difference between the two methods where the gradient
changes. This is shown more explicitly in Figure 3.18, where the evolution of
the ODEs is compared with the stochastic simulation of the PEPA model [6]
derived directly using the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in. When N is sufficiently far
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Figure 3.17: Average response time calculated by the ODE method and QN
approximation, rq = rB = rA = rc = 1 and ru = 1.1
from the gradient change there is good agreement between the ODE solution
and the stochastic simulation. However, at N = 6 the divergence is significant;
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the stochastic simulation never achieves the lower queue length predicted by the
ODEs.
It is of clear practical importance to be able to predict the divergence. This point,
N∗, can be estimated using the method of asymptotic bounds of closed queueing
networks (see Haverkort [28] pages 245-246 for example).
N∗ = K +
Krp
rx
= K +Krp
(
1
rq
+
1
rB
+
1
rA
+
1
rc
+
1
ru
)
(3.3)
Below N∗ the asymptotic bound is given as
L(N) =
Nrx
rx + rp
(3.4)
Above N∗ the asymptotic bound is given as
L(N) =
Nrx −Krp
rx
(3.5)
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These bounds can also easily be found by solving the ODEs analytically in the
limit t −→∞, where the min(KDC(t), Alice1(t)) term is replaced with Alice1(t)
and KDC(t) respectively. Thus, in this instance at least, the ODE solution is
giving an alternative means for calculating known asymptotic results for closed
queueing networks (see [65]). Note that W (N) is computed from L(N−1), and so
in Figure 10, the divergence occurs at approximately 6.91 (rp = 1), 11.82 (rp = 2)
and 21.64 (rp = 4), i.e. N
∗ + 1.
We have also compared the two methods for larger values of N and have found
there to be almost no difference for N > 40 for the parameters used here. It is
important to note that there are numerical issues with computing the queueing
approximation due to the difficulty of handling large factorials (and their recip-
rocals) and these problems do not occur with the ODE solutions or asymptotic
results. Thus, as long as we avoid the region around N∗, the ODE solution is
giving accurate results without problems with scalability.
3.5.2 Multiple KDC servers
We now turn our attention to the consideration of multiple servers at the KDC.
In particular we would wish to know if it is more beneficial to increase the number
of servers or increase the speed of the server. It is well known that for an M/M/K
queue, it is preferable to have 1 server serving at rate µ than K servers serving
at rate µ/K. This is because if there are less than K jobs in the queue then
some of the K servers will be idle, thus reducing the overall service rate. In
the ODEs above this is evident in rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t)). If Alice1(t) > K
then all K servers are in use and the flow rate from the KDC would be Krp.
However, if Alice1(t) < K then fewer servers would be in use and the rate would
be rpAlice1(t).
There is an issue with specifying the interactions between multiple components
in PEPA that we need to be aware of here. We can easily increase the number
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of servers at the KDC in the PEPA specification.
System
def
= (KDC|| . . . ||KDC) BC
response
(Alice|| . . . ||Alice)
However, we must give the response action in Alice the rate rp, rather than being
passive.
Alice
def
= (response, rp).(τ, rx).Alice
This is because of the way in which a passive action would be subject to the
apparent rate in PEPA. Hence, K KDCs and 1 Alice would give rise to response
occurring at rate Krp; whereas if the rate is rp in both KDC and Alice, then
this problem does not arise.
Thus the approximation becomes an M/M/K/./N queue, where K is the number
of instances of the KDC component (i.e. servers at the KDC). Hence the balance
equations become,
(N − i)rxpii = (i+ 1)rppii+1 , 0 ≤ i < K
(N − i)rxpii = Krppii+1 , K ≤ i < N
Thus we can calculate pi0
pi0 =
[
N !
K−1∑
i=0
ρi
(N − i)!i! +N !
N∑
i=K
ρi
(N − i)!K!Ki−K
]−1
The average queue length can be then calculated by
 L = N !pi0
[
K−1∑
i=1
ρii
(N − i)!i! +
N∑
i=K
ρii
(N − i)!K!Ki−K
]
The average response time and throughput can then be computed as before.
Figure 3.19 shows the proportion of Alices waiting at the KDC (i.e. L(N)/N) for
K = 1 with rp = 4 and K = 4 with rp = 1 for both the queue approximation and
the ODE solution. When N is large (in this case N ≥ 25) the ODE values are the
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same, however for smaller N the single faster server is seen to perform better (for
the reason discussed above). The reason the ODE values are identical for large
N is simply that the fluid level of Alices waiting at the KDC will never fall below
K in the ODE solution. The values for the QN approximation differ slightly from
each other, even when N = 40. This is because even at this load there is still the
chance that the queue will fall below 4 requests for short periods. Clearly, as N
increases the probability that this happens will become increasingly insignificant
and hence the values will converge.
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Figure 3.19: Proportion of Alice1 components, calculated by ODE solution and
QN model, rq = rB = rA = rc = 1 and ru = 1.1
There is a clear divergence between the ODE and QN results around the change
in gradient as we have already observed in Figure 3.17. Figure 3.20 shows this in
more detail for the average queue size. Note that although the two ODE solutions
converge atN = 25, there is still a significant difference with the queueing network
(QN) solutions at this point, near to N∗.
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3.6 Utility function
We now return to our proposed utility function.
C = c1L+ c2Krp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (3.6)
Taking the asymptotic results (3.4) and (3.5) for L gives a simple exposition of
this utility function. If N < N∗ then
C =
c1Nrx
rx + rp
+ c2Krp (3.7)
This function is always increasing with K. If N > N∗ then
C = c1
Nrx −Krp
rx
+ c2Krp (3.8)
If we seek to find the largest value of N before the performance begins to signif-
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icantly degrade, then (3.7) and (3.8) will increase linearly with N (as all other
parameters are fixed). Clearly, the rate of cost increase after N∗ will always be
greater than the rate below N∗. Thus, N∗ represents the point at which the
cost begins to grow significantly, especially if rp is large. Similarly, if we seek to
minimise C with respect to K for a given N then c1Nrx is fixed and so (3.8) is
increasing with K if c1 < rxc2.
Now, recall that (3.3) gives
N∗ = K
(
rx + rp
rx
)
So, for small K, N∗ will also be small and as K increases, so will N∗. If N is
fixed, then we can define K∗ such that:
K∗ = N
(
rx
rx + rp
)
Clearly, if K < K∗ then N > N∗ and if K > K∗ then N < N∗. Thus, (3.7)
and (3.8) predict the optimal value of K to be Kopt = 1 if c1 < rxc2 and Kopt =
INT (K∗ + 0.5) if c1 > rxc2 However, as these asymptotic results will always
underestimate L in the region around N∗ the relationship is more accurately
described as Kopt = 1 if c1 ≤ rxc2 and Kopt ≈ K∗ if c1 > rxc2.
3.6.1 Numerical results of utility function
We now illustrate the scenarios described above through numerical examples.
Figures 3.21 and 3.22 show the cost varied against the number of clients, cal-
culated by the queueing network model and ODEs respectively. Clearly, under
these parameter values with rp = 1, the cost rises rapidly at around 80 clients,
which is the approximate maximum capability that the KDC can handle before
performance starts to significantly degrade. In a small system (N < 60), the
utility function is dominated by c2Krp, hence the cost is greater for a faster
KDC. The reason for this is the server will often be idle, and so the system is
79
not making efficient use of computational resources. In the cases rp = 2, 3 and
4, when N = 120 clients the exact computation of C using the queueing network
model becomes more costly, and so we adopt the use of the ODE solution. Figure
3.22 shows that the maximum number of clients which can be supported by the
KDC in case of rp = 2, 3 and 4 are around 210, 310 and 410, respectively with
these parameter values. Thus, doubling the service rate from rp = 2 to rp = 4
effectively doubles the capacity of the system in this case.
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Figure 3.21: Cost varied against the number of clients calculated by the queueing
network model, K = 1, c1 = c2 = 1, rq = rA = rB = rc = 1, ru = 0.01
We now start to seek to find the optimal value of K in order to minimize the
cost of the system. According to the analysis in the previous section, Kopt always
equals 1 when c1 ≤ rxc2. Hence, investigation of Kopt when c1 > rxc2 is more
interesting and valuable. We employ the ODE solution as the more efficient
approach in optimisation, particularly as we wish to explore larger population
sizes (N = 500, 1000, 2000 clients). In addition, we consider the running cost
c2 to be either 1/10 or 10, to explore the case where we are more interested in
minimising running costs or queue length (hence response time).
Figure 3.23 shows the results of cost varied with number of KDCs. Generally,
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Figure 3.22: Cost varied against the number of clients calculated by ODEs, K =
1, c1 = c2 = 1, rq = rA = rB = rc = 1, ru = 0.01
more clients need more KDCs to support them, in order to reduce the optimal
cost. In each of the three cases (N = 500, N = 1000 and N = 2000 clients), the
larger c2 results in a decreasing cost before the optimal point and an increasing
rate after that. For any given number of clients, the optimal value of K in Figure
14 is shown to be independent of c2. Kopt =5, 10, 20 for N = 500, 1000, 2000
although results from the asymptotic solution are not entirely accurate around N*.
The real optimal value of K should be around these values (K∗). Consequently,
we calculated a range of K around K∗ by the queueing network model to show
how the true value of Kopt can vary from K
∗. Figure 3.24 compares the cost
around K∗ in case of 1000 clients with c2 = 0.1 and 10 calculated by ODEs
and the queueing network model. In the case of c2 = 10, Kopt is 10 which
is the same as the ODE result but with a slightly different value of cost. In
the case of c2 = 0.1, 15 KDCs gives the minimal cost with value 11.144 which
is slightly smaller than case of K = 14 and 16 with value 11.184 and 11.178,
respectively. The cost at K∗ is calculated by ODEs which is clearly close to the
optimal value. As such we propose that the asymptotic bound, whilst not giving
the exact optimal solution in every case, can often be used to calculate a near
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optimal cost extremely efficiently.
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Figure 3.23: Cost varied with number of KDCs calculated by ODEs, c1 = 1,
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Figure 3.25 shows the cost varied with the rate of key refresh, calculated by ODEs.
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In this experiment, the number of servers and clients has been fixed. Generally,
large ru results in a greater cost, caused by more frequently refreshing the key
and hence more workload has been added to the KDC servers, and consequently
more waiting jobs. As noted by Stallings [59], although the cost is increased, the
system becomes more secure as the eavesdropper has less cipher text to crack
any given session key. A security manager must try to make a balance between
security and performance. The balance point here is the value of ru where the
cost starts to increase rapidly. It is a simple matter to find that ru = 0.01 is the
approximate optimal refresh rate for all three cases considered (c2 = 0.1, 1 and
10). Thus it is clear that the simple ODE solution is sufficient to find the measure
require and in practical circumstance, the security manager could choose a value
for ru ≤ 0.01.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how a key distribution centre can be modelled
and analysed using the Markovian process algebra PEPA. The intuitive means
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of modelling the protocol is cumbersome and suffers from state space explosion,
preventing meaningful analysis with significant numbers of clients. We have taken
three main approaches to coping with this problem; first we have implemented a
simulation of the model, secondly we have attempted to approximate the system
behaviour with a much simpler model, and finally ODE analysis has been applied
as a deterministic fluid flow analysis. The approximation shows good accuracy
of prediction when compared with simulation, scales exceptionally well and is
fast to compute. ODE results have been compared with those derived from the
approximation. This (ODE) approach has two main limitations. Firstly, it is not
always as accurate as the queueing approximation and secondly, we have not been
able to obtain all our desired metrics. However, the ODE approach does not suffer
the same numerical problems as the queueing approximation, is very efficient to
solve and is shown to be very accurate when the number of clients is large. By
using the asymptotic results, it is possible to compute the metrics of interest very
efficiently. These techniques have been applied to a utility function to explore
the capacity planning for a system associated with this protocol. Three proposed
questions have been answered through numerical results which have been acquired
by a very efficient approach of combining techniques.
We can improve our proposed work flow by this case study. In the modelling
stage, one can model the clients as the same replicated component (first and
third modelling choice in this Chapter) or assign different name to it (second
modelling choice in this Chapter). If the performance model is simple and small
scaled, one can directly analyse it, otherwise, the model should be simplified.
Partial evaluation is able to be employed to reduced the components of clients, if
the clients in security protocols are tightly coupled. In the analysis stage, CTMC
method can be applied if the simplified model is small enough. If the PEPA
model can be transformed to a simple closed queueing network model, one only
need to calculated the balance equation to solve the model. Furthermore, one
can resort to ODE analysis to very large scale models. This is an approximation
which only gives accurate results when system is very large. Therefore, it is a
good complement to other exact solutions.
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Chapter 4
Non-repudiation Protocols
ZG1&ZG3
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter two non-repudiation protocols are studied that are used to extend
the kind of modelling and analysis introduced in Chapter 3. The behaviour of
the first protocol is similar to the KDC model in Chapter 3. The second protocol
behaves more complicatedly as the non-repudiation server is able to serve multiple
classes of job. For the analysis, the ODE solution has been employed for reasons
of efficiency. The second protocol highlights a PEPA modelling problem, which is
the server capturing an unintended race. This problem has been solved by using
functional rates. In addition, mean value analysis (MVA) techniques has been
applied. MVA is not as computationally efficient as the ODE solution, however,
it is also not complicated and might therefore be used as an alternative solution
in situations when the ODE solution is not accurate, i.e. around N∗. Finally, a
utility function of second protocol is introduced to make a cost analysis. The novel
contributions of this Chapter includes applying MVA to a class of PEPA model,
the functional rates specification to solve an unintended resource competition,
and detailed comparison between ODE approximation and MVA.
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we
introduce the two non-repudiation protocols to be modelled. Then, the PEPA
models of two non-repudiation protocols are introduced, and this is followed by
numerical results. Section 4.5 describes some of the problems with the current
mean value analysis approach in PEPA and presents some extended numerical
results. After that, functional rates are utilized to solve the problem of an unin-
tended race and illustrated by some numerical results in Section 4.6. In Section
4.7, a cost function of ZG3 and its numerical results are presented. There is a
summary in final section.
4.2 Non-repudiation protocols specification
A non-repudiation service will prevent either of the principals involved from deny-
ing the contract after the agreement. The two protocols depicted here were first
proposed by Zhou and Gollmann [71, 72] and use a non-repudiation server, known
as a Trusted Third Party (TTP). We denote these two protocols by ZG1 and ZG3,
respectively.
4.2.1 ZG1 specification
• A: originator of the non-repudiation exchange
• B: recipient of the non-repudiation exchange
• TTP : on-line trusted third party provide network services accessible to the
public
• M : message sent from A to B
• C: ciphertext for message M
• K: message key defined by A
• NRO = sSA(fNRO, B, L, C) : Non-repudiation of origin for M
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• NRR = sSB(fNRR, A, L, C) : Non-repudiation of receipt for M
• sub K = sSA(fSUB, B, L,K) : proof of submission of K
• con K = sST (fCON , A,B, L,K) : confirmation of K issued by TTP
First, A sends the ciphertext (C) and a non-repudiation origin (NRO) for message
M to B, and then B replies back with a non-repudiation receipt (NRR) to A.
Now B possesses the ciphertext, but cannot read it as he still hasn’t got the key
to decrypt C. According to the non-repudiation requirement, B is not a trusted
agency to A for sending the key directly to B, they only can resort to a trusted
third party (TTP ). After receiving the key and proof of submission (sub K), the
TTP will generate a confirmation of K (con K) and publish in a read only public
area. Finally, B can get the key from this public area to decrypt ciphertext (C)
and A fetches the confirmation of submission as non-repudiation evidence.
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Figure 4.1: A non-repudiation protocol invented by Zhou and Gollmann (ZG1)
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(sendB) 1.A→ B : fNRO, B, L, C,NRO
(sendA) 2.B → A : fNRR, A, L,NRR
(sendTTP ) 3.A→ TTP : fSUB, B, L,K, sub K
(publish&
getByB) 4.B ↔ TTP : fCON , A,B, L,K, con K
(publish&
getByA) 5.A↔ TTP : fCON , A,B, L,K, con K
4.2.2 ZG3 specification
• L : a unique label chosen by TTP to identify the message M
• Ts : the time that TTP received A’s submission
• Td : the time that TTP delivered and available to B
• NRO = sSA(fNRO, TTP,B,M) : non-repudiation of origin for M
• NRS = sSD(fNRS, A,B, Ts, L,NRO) : non-repudiation of submission of M
• NRR = sSB(fNRR, TTP,A, L,NRO) : non-repudiation of receiving a mes-
sage labelled L
• NRD = sSD(fNRD, A,B, Td, L,NRR) : non-repudiation of delivery of M
ZG1 describes a non-repudiation protocol with minimized involvement of a trusted
third party, acting as a “low weight notary”. However, timing evidence of sending
and receiving is required in some applications; hence ZG3 can be adopted in this
situation. A sends the plaintext (M) and a non-repudiation origin (NRO) to the
trusted third part (TTP ), and then fetches the time of receiving (Ts) and non-
repudiation of submission (NRS) from a public area, after TTP has published
this information. The TTP tells B it received M from A by sending the NRO.
B generates a non-repudiation of receiving for TTP following. Finally, B and A
can fetch M and the time of delivery (Td), with other non-repudiation evidence,
from the public area, after the TTP has published.
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Figure 4.2: Another non-repudiation protocol invented by Zhou and Gollmann
(ZG3)
(request) 1.A→ TTP : fNRO, TTP,B,M,NRO
(response&
getByA1) 2.A↔ TTP : fNRS, A,B, Ts, L,NRS
(response) 3.TTP → B : A,L,NRO
(sendTTP ) 4.B → TTP : fNRR, L,NRR
(response&
getByB) 5.B ↔ TTP : L,M
(response&
getByA2) 6.A↔ TTP : fNRD, Td, L,NRR,NRD
As ZG1 is very similar to KDC, we now only propose three similar performance
questions for ZG3: “how many clients can a given TTP configuration support?”,
“how much service capacity must we provide at a TTP to satisfy a given number
of clients?” and “what is the maximum rate at which keys can be refreshed before
the TTP performance begins to degrade?” These questions are answered through
numerical results in section 4.7.
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4.3 PEPA models of non-repudiation
Following the approach established in the analysis of KDC protocols in Chapter
3, we form a translation from the protocol specification into a PEPA model and
extend this to the multiple client case.
4.3.1 ZG1 PEPA Model
We begin by forming components of a pair of principals A and B.
TTP
def
= (publish, rp).TTP
A0
def
= (sendB, rb).A1
A1
def
= (sendA, ra).A2
A2
def
= (sendTTP, rt).A3
A3
def
= (publish, rp).A4
A4
def
= (geyByA, rga).A5
A5
def
= (work, rw).A0
B0
def
= (sendB, rb).B1
B1
def
= (sendA, ra).B2
B2
def
= (publish, rp).B3
B3
def
= (getByB, rgb).B4
B4
def
= (work, rw).B0
SystemZG1
def
= TTP [K] BC
publish
(A0BCL B0)[N ]
Where, L = {sendB, sendA,work}.
In order to simplify the model specification and analysis, we combine A and B
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into a new component called AB, using a process referred to as partial evaluation
[11]. This gives rise to the following description for the complete system when
there are N pairs of principals.
TTP
def
= (publish, rp).TTP
AB0
def
= (sendB, rb).AB1
AB1
def
= (sendA, ra).AB2
AB2
def
= (sendTTP, rt).AB3
AB3
def
= (publish, rp).AB4
AB4
def
= (getByA, rga).AB5
+(getByB, rgb).AB6
AB5
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB7
AB6
def
= (getByA, rga).AB7
AB7
def
= (work, rw).AB0
SystemZG1
def
= TTP [K] BC
publish
AB0[N ]
AB0 to AB7 in the above ZG1 PEPA model denote the different behaviours of
the AB component, and its evolution along the sequence of prescribed actions
in the protocol. The choice from AB4 to AB5 and AB6 means step 4 and step
5 in ZG1 can happen in any order. The work action is used to define that B
can do something with the key and ciphertext after he has obtained these, before
returning to the state AB0 to make a new request again, which forms a working
cycle to investigate the steady state.
4.3.2 ZG3 PEPA Model
Once again we begin by defining the behaviour of a pair of principals.
TTP
def
= (response, rp).TTP
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A0
def
= (request, rt1).A1
A1
def
= (response, rp).A2
A2
def
= (getByA1, rga1).A3
A3
def
= (response, rp).A4
A4
def
= (sendTTP, rt2).A5
A5
def
= (response, rp).A6
A6
def
= (getByA2, rga2).A7
A7
def
= (work, rw).A0
B0
def
= (response, rp).B1
B1
def
= (getByA1, rga1).B2
B2
def
= (response, rp).B3
B3
def
= (sendTTP, rt2).B4
B4
def
= (response, rp).B5
B5
def
= (getByB, rgb).B6
B6
def
= (work, rw).B0
SystemZG3
def
= TTP [K] BC
response
(A0BCL B0)[N ]
Where, L = {getByA1, sendTTP,work}.
As before, these are combined to form the merged component AB in the descrip-
tion of the complete system.
TTP
def
= (response, rp).TTP
AB0
def
= (request, rt1).AB1
AB1
def
= (response, rp).AB2
AB2
def
= (getByA1, rga1).AB3
AB3
def
= (response, rp).AB4
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AB4
def
= (sendTTP, rt2).AB5
AB5
def
= (response, rp).AB6
AB6
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB7
+(getByA2, rga2).AB8
AB7
def
= (getByA2, rga2).AB9
AB8
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB9
AB9
def
= (work, rw).AB0
SystemZG3
def
= TTP [K] BC
response
AB0[N ]
The PEPA model of ZG3 has a similar structure to that for ZG1. The main
difference is the TTP component in ZG3 should respond three times for different
requests in one cycle, which increases the difficulty of modelling and analysis, as
discussed in Section 4.5.
4.3.3 Mean value analysis
Mean value analysis, which has been described in Chapter 2, is a traditional
efficient solution for stochastic models. MVA is efficient as it avoids generation
of the entire Markov chain. We defined a class of PEPA models, which can be
applied with MVA. ZG1 and ZG3, which are the first two PEPA models that
have been applied with MVA, belong to this class of PEPA model. Because of
the computational effort of the exact solution, an approximated version has been
applied here. The approximation also shows acceptable results in a case study in
Chapter 3, and it is good enough for most purposes.
Three key points should be addressed for the models studied here. First, in order
to apply this characteristic model amenable to mean value analysis to ZG1 and
ZG3, the branching actions have been modified to have the same name in each
model (see the equations below for each model respectively). This modification
does not affect the analysis and is merely a consequence of the way in which the
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class has been specified.
AB4
def
= (get, rga).AB5 + (get, rgb).AB6 (ZG1)
AB6
def
= (get, rgb).AB7 + (get, rga2).AB8 (ZG3)
The second factor is the calculation of a quantity referred to as the visit count
(Vi). This quantity specifies the number of times a derivative ABi is encountered,
relative to some reference derivative ABI . For both models here, all Vi is 1, except
the branching points. For ZG1:
V5 =
rga
rga + rgb
V6 =
rgb
rga + rgb
For ZG3:
V7 =
rgb
rga2 + rgb
V8 =
rga2
rga2 + rgb
The final observation is that the rates of the response actions in ZG3 are the
same in AB1, AB3 and AB5. This restriction is necessary in order to restrict the
overall service rate at the TTP. Whilst this can affect the performance estimation
of individual parts of the protocol, this restriction has negligible effect of on overall
mean system performance.
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4.3.4 ODE analysis
ODE analysis is the most efficient solution of the techniques that were introduced
in the last chapter. Although, the approximation is inaccurate around a location
(N∗), it gives a very good trend and is very accurate when population is large.
The area around N∗ also can be solved by other exact solutions (i.e. MVA) as a
combined solution if necessary. In addition the location of N∗ can be predicted
by deriving the point at which the two sides of the minimum function coincide.
A more detailed description can be found in [34] and also a brief description in
Chapter 2.
In experiments we have performed with different models, we have observed that
the ODEs give good predictions of the steady state behaviour only when there is
at most one active minimum function [65]. This condition holds for the models
considered here as there is only one type of Trusted Third Party.
The ODEs for ZG1 and ZG3 can be derived following the approach of Hillston [34].
ODEs of ZG1:
d
dt
AB0(t) = rwAB7(t)− rbAB0(t)
d
dt
AB1(t) = rbAB0(t)− raAB1(t)
d
dt
AB2(t) = raAB1(t)− rtAB2(t)
d
dt
AB3(t) = rtAB2(t)− rpmin(AB3(t), TTP (t))
d
dt
AB4(t) = rpmin(AB3(t), TTP (t))
−rgaAB4(t)− rgbAB4(t)
d
dt
AB5(t) = rgaAB4(t)− rgbAB5(t)
d
dt
AB6(t) = rgbAB4(t)− rgaAB6(t)
d
dt
AB7(t) = rgbAB5(t) + rgaAB6(t)− rwAB7(t)
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ddt
TTP (t) = 0
ODEs of ZG3:
d
dt
AB0(t) = rwAB9(t)− rt1AB0(t)
d
dt
AB1(t) = rt1AB0(t)− [rp AB1(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB2(t) = −rga1AB2(t) + [rp AB1(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB3(t) = rga1AB2(t)− [rp AB3(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB4(t) = −rt2AB4(t) + [rp AB3(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB5(t) = rt2AB4(t)− [rp AB5(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB6(t) = −rgbAB6(t)
−rga2AB6(t) + [rp AB5(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB7(t) = rgbAB6(t)− rga2AB7(t)
d
dt
AB8(t) = rga2AB6(t)− rgbAB8(t)
d
dt
AB9(t) = rga2AB7(t) + rgbAB8(t)− rwAB9(t)
d
dt
TTP (t) = 0
Our analysis is interested primarily in the number of clients waiting for a publish
(or response in ZG3) action from the TTP , as the clients can then fetch what
they need from the public area or obtain a service results. This is represented
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in the model by the number of AB3 in ZG1, AB1, AB3 and AB5 in ZG3. The
average queuing length L(N) is the number of requests awaiting a response from
the TTP . It is the number of the AB3 (in ZG1), or AB1, AB3 and AB5 (in ZG3),
derivatives when t −→∞ when there are N customers in the population.
The average response time is another interesting metric for us. Again, the same
as KDC application to obtain this we apply the arrival theorem. It can be ap-
proximately calculated as follows.
W (N) =
1
rp
, L(N − 1) + 1 ≤ K
W (N) =
1
rp
+
L(N − 1) + 1−K
Krp
=
L(N − 1) + 1
Krp
, L(N − 1) + 1 > K
4.4 Numerical results
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Figure 4.3: Average number of waiting jobs of ZG1 calculated by the ODE and
MVA, rp = rb = ra = rt = rga = rgb = 1, rw = 0.01
97
0.0E+00
2.0E+07
4.0E+07
6.0E+07
8.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.2E+08
1.0E+02 1.0E+03 1.0E+04 1.0E+05 1.0E+06 1.0E+07 1.0E+08
N
L(N)
Figure 4.4: Average number of waiting jobs of ZG1 calculated by the ODE,
rp = rb = ra = rt = rga = rgb = 1, rw = 0.01
Figure 4.3 shows the average number of waiting client requests calculated by
MVA compared with ODE results. Obviously, the average number of waiting
clients increases as the population size increases. The rate of increase is initially
slow, but is far greater when N is large. As we would expect, the results from
ODE analysis are acceptable when N is very small or very large. The maximum
divergence point emerges when N = 110, the further we go beyond this point, the
more accurate the results become. Hence, if we set this case in a real situation,
ODE analysis becomes the best choice as its efficiency and accuracy when N
larger than about 150, as MVA tends to compute more slowly for larger N . The
results of ODE analysis for larger numbers of clients are presented in Figure 4.4.
The ODEs are solved in Matlab within less than one minute for largest case
(N = 108) in our graph, rather than MVA which takes more than 20 minutes
when N is 105.
Figure 4.5 shows the average number of waiting jobs at the TTP , for different
values of service (publish) rate, rp, varied with population size, N . The compar-
ison is between a single server and multiple servers with the same total service
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Figure 4.5: Average number of waiting jobs of ZG1 varied with population size
calculated by the MVA, rb = ra = rt = rga = rgb = 1, rw = 0.01
capacity. In initial stages (small N and small average queue length), the case of
rp = 0.2 and K = 3 shows the worst performance(longer queueing size), as not all
serves have been utilised and the working servers have lower capability. Therefore,
we can see a linear growth of queueing length when K = 3 and N < 50. However,
once the population grows sufficiently for all servers to be highly utilised, then the
three cases will show identical performance. Obviously, when demand is low, it
is better to have one fast server than several slow ones, but as demand increases,
only the overall service capacity matters.
This situation is clearer when we plot the average response time varied with
number of clients in Figure 4.6. The average response time does not change when
there are a small number of clients involved in the system, but the performance
converges once there are sufficiently large populations.
Under the assumption of the same rate of response for derivatives of AB1, AB3
and AB5, ZG3 performs very similarly to ZG1, as illustrated in Figure 4.7, Figure
4.8 and Figure 4.9 with the same parameters as the ZG1 model. According to
the assumption, AB1, AB3 and AB5 always have the same value. Therefore, we
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Figure 4.6: Average response time of ZG1 varied with population size calculated
by the MVA, rb = ra = rt = rga = rgb = 1, rw = 0.01
choose one of them to be presented in these three figures.
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Figure 4.7: Average number of AB1 component of ZG3 calculated by the ODE
and MVA, rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01
Figure 4.10 compares the performance between ZG1 and ZG3. Obviously, as the
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Figure 4.9: Average response time for AB1 component of ZG3 varied with popula-
tion size calculated by the MVA, rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01
TTP in ZG1 is designed as a “low weight notary”, the number of waiting requests
at the TTP of ZG1 is always smaller than that in ZG3 with the same parameters.
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However, a system engineer should clearly be very careful to choose either of
these two protocols based on the trade off between performance and the need for
added security functionality.
4.5 Limitations and Extended results
We have specified the ZG3 model using the same service (response) rate, as there
are two main difficulties if publishing with different rates for derivative AB1, AB3
and AB5. Firstly, if the TTP serves the three jobs with different rates, then the
PEPA model of ZG3 is intuitively written like
TTP
def
= (response1, rp1).TTP + (response2, rp2).TTP
+(response3, rp3).TTP
However, this expression gives rise to a competition between response1, response2
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and response3 in PEPA, which does not capture the intended behaviour of the
actual system. This problem can be solved by using functional rates (see details
in next section).
Another problem is the average response time calculation using MVA with dif-
ferent service rates at the TTP and multiple servers. In this case, in order to
obtain the response time, the time it takes for one TTP server to become avail-
able should be calculated first. However, in FCFS queueing this requires us to
know the queued order of the requests, which is clearly infeasible. We can only
obtain the response time for three responding rates when there is a single TTP
server. Thus, the waiting time for an arriving request is the time for a single
TTP server to respond to all the requests in the queue, which does not require
any knowledge about the order in which requests are queued.
This situation has been illustrated in Figure 4.11, which we include here as an
indication of the kind of scenario we could investigate. Here W (1), W (3) and
W (5) denotes the response times for the three responding actions by the TTP
in the ZG3 protocol, with the rates rp1,rp2 and rp3 respectively. These are equiv-
alent to the derivatives AB1, AB3 and AB5 in the PEPA model. Clearly, the
average response time for the second job type is slightly larger than first one and
smaller than third job, because of the reciprocal ratio between response time and
responding rate. However, average response time of all three job types grow at
the same rate. The reason is obviously that the time for processing all the re-
quests already within the queue is the same, only the time to process the arriving
request differs. Thus, the difference between the response times of these three
response actions is a constant.
It is also interesting to note the differences that occur as we alter the rate of the
second and third response action. This difference between the two sets of curves
is quite significant, far more so than we might naively expect. The initial stage
(N = 1 ∼ 5) of the average response time of the second type of jobs (W (3))
becomes larger as response rate decreases. Nevertheless, all three job types tends
to respond quicker than the first set as N increases, because the average service
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Figure 4.11: Average response time of ZG3 varied with population size with
different service rates on second job type calculated by the MVA, rp1 = rt1 =
rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01
time (1/rp1+1/rp2+1/rp3) is decreased, and the proportion of this type of request
waiting at the TTP is smaller.
4.6 Functional Rates Specification
As we mentioned above, an intended race gives over capacity of the servers when
different publish actions are modelled. Each type of services should only stick on
this type of customer. Therefore, the actual service rate in our model becomes a
function of number of each type of customers waiting for the service. The model
with functional rates can be specified as follow:
AB0
def
= (request, rt1).AB1
AB1
def
= (publish1, rx1).AB2
AB2
def
= (getByA1, rga1).AB3
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AB3
def
= (sendB, rx3).AB4
AB4
def
= (sendTTP, rt2).AB5
AB5
def
= (publish2, rx2).AB6
AB6
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB7
+(getByA2, rga2).AB8
AB7
def
= (getByA2, rga2).AB9
AB8
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB9
AB9
def
= (work, rw).AB0
TTP
def
= (publish1, rx1).TTP
+(publish2, rx2).TTP
+(sendB, rx3).TTP
System
def
= TTP [K] BC
publish1,publish2,sendB
AB0[N ]
Where,
rx1 = rp1
AB1(t)
AB1(t)+AB3(t)+AB5(t)
min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t)),
rx2 = rp2
AB5(t)
AB1(t)+AB3(t)+AB5(t)
min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t)).
rx3 = rb
AB3(t)
AB1(t)+AB3(t)+AB5(t)
min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t)).
publish1, publish2, sendB are the different action names corresponding to response
in ZG3 model in section 4.2.
In this ZG3 PEPA model, we specified the functional rates for each cooperation
under action publish1, publish2 and sendB by rx1, rx2 and rx3, respectively,
instead of rp1, rp2 and rb. Each of these function describes a product of the
actual service rate for one job in the system(rp1, rp2 or rb), the proportion of the
number of waiting jobs of each type (ABi ∗ ((AB1 +AB3 +AB5)−1), i = 1, 3, 5)
and the times of service (min(TTP,AB1+AB3+AB5)), which stick each service
only on its job type to eliminate the potential race.
There are several ways to solve this model. The most convenient and direct way
is loading the PEPA in IPC (International PEPA Compiler) [73] tool and solve it.
The PEPA eclipse plug-in [68, 74] is usable, but does not support PEPA models
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with functional rates. However, it is possible to derive an equivalent model in
the CMDL (Chemical Model Definition Language) format directly from above
PEPA model using a version of the PEPA eclipse plug-in, which can contain rate
functions and is able to be analyzed by the fluid flow approach (based on ODE)
or stochastic simulation, supported by the tool. The following CMDL model is
generated by eclipse plug-in and modified with functional rates.
//Rates //Population sizes
rb = 1.0; AB0 = N ;
rga1 = 1.0; AB1 = 0;
rga2 = 1.0; AB2 = 0;
rgb = 1.0; AB3 = 0;
rp1 = 1.0; AB4 = 0;
rp2 = 1.0; AB5 = 0;
rt1 = 1.0; AB6 = 0;
rt2 = 1.0; AB7 = 0;
rw = 0.01; AB8 = 0;
AB9 = 0;
TTP = K;
//Reactions
getByA1, AB2 → AB3, rga1;
getByA21, AB6 → AB7, rga2;
getByA22, AB8 → AB9, rga2;
getByB1, AB6 → AB8, rgb;
getByB2, AB7 → AB9, rgb;
publish1, TTP + AB1 → TTP + AB2, rx1;
publish2, TTP + AB5 → TTP + AB6, rx2;
request, AB0 → AB1, rt1;
sendB, TTP + AB3 → TTP + AB4, rx3;
sendTTP,AB4 → AB5, rt2;
work,AB9 → AB0, rw;
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Where,
rx1 = [rp1 ∗ AB1 ∗ ((AB1 + AB3 + AB5)−1) ∗min(TTP,AB1 + AB3 + AB5)]
rx2 = [rp2 ∗ AB5 ∗ ((AB1 + AB3 + AB5)−1) ∗min(TTP,AB1 + AB3 + AB5)]
rx3 = [rb ∗ AB3 ∗ ((AB1 + AB3 + AB5)−1) ∗min(TTP,AB1 + AB3 + AB5)]
This CMDL format model is formed by Rates, Population sizes and Reactions.
TheRates section is exactly the same as specified in the PEPA model. Population sizes
contains the initial population of all derivatives and components. In our scenario,
there are N pair clients which have not started any behaviours at the initial stage,
that are represented by AB0 = N and other derivatives have no population. K is
the population of the TTP all the time as there are no derivatives associated with
it. The most important and main section of CMDL definition is Reactions, in
which system behaviours defined as all actions name, individual state transitions
and their rates.
The final solution is derived manually by generating a set of ODEs which repre-
sent the PEPA Model, then solving these ODEs by any mathematical tools, e.g.
MatLab. This kind of method is not convenient in terms of personal effort(writing
ODEs and scripting code), however, it is more flexible. The set of ODEs with
functional rates can be derived as follows:
d
dt
AB0(t) = rwAB9(t)− rt1AB0(t)
d
dt
AB1(t) = rt1AB0(t)− [rp1 AB1(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB2(t) = −rga1AB2(t) + [rp1 AB1(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB3(t) = rga1AB2(t)− [rb AB3(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB4(t) = −rt2AB4(t) + [rb AB3(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
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×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB5(t) = rt2AB4(t)− [rp2 AB5(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB6(t) = −rgbAB6(t)
−rga2AB6(t) + [rp2 AB5(t)
AB1(t) + AB3t+ AB5(t)
×min(AB1(t) + AB3(t) + AB5(t), TTP (t))]
d
dt
AB7(t) = rgbAB6(t)− rga2AB7(t)
d
dt
AB8(t) = rga2AB6(t)− rgbAB8(t)
d
dt
AB9(t) = rga2AB7(t) + rgbAB8(t)− rwAB9(t)
d
dt
TTP (t) = 0
4.6.1 Numerial results
Previously in this chapter, an assumption of the same action name and the same
rates has been made for publish1, publish2 and sendB. With functional rates,
now more general scenario can be investigated. e.g. any differences between these
three TTP services.
Figure 4.12 shows the average queue length varied with the number of customers
involved in this non-repudiation system, solved by the ODE solution supported by
the tool. The divergence point (N∗) is at N = 14 and 16 respectively for the two
curves. According to the results derived in the previous chapter, it is known that
the further one goes from this area, the more accurate the ODE analysis becomes.
However, this does not really affect our analysis, and the divergence point can be
exactly predicted. The queuing length increases when more customers join the
system for both cases. In the case where rp1 = 0.5 and rp2 = 0.2, the number
of waiting jobs is always larger than when rp1 = 0.4 and rp2 = 0.3, due to the
lower average service rate. In addition, the queue length of this set of parameters
increases faster, because the slower server gets more load.
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Figure 4.12: Average queue length varied with population size calculated by the
ODE, rb = rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01, K = 1
To calculate the average response time, the equations which were proposed in
Section 4.4 can no longer be adopted. As the second limitation we described
in Section 4.5, response time can not be calculated easily in the case of multiple
servers and multi-type services in one station. However, if we assume there is just
one sever in a queueing station, then the average response time is the average
service time of all jobs ahead of a randomly observed job, plus the time to serve
the randomly observed job [46]. In this case(ZG3), the equation can be written
as follows:
W =
L(1)
rp1
+
L(3)
rb
+
L(5)
rp2
+
1
ri
, ri = rp1, rb, rp2 (4.1)
Where, the service rate ri depends on the job type of the random observer, and
L(1),L(3) and L(5) are the number of different types of waiting jobs.
Figure 4.13 shows the average response time varied with system capacity by
individual service behaviours. Here W (1), W (3) and W (5) denote the response
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times for the three responding actions by the TTP in the protocol, with the
rates rp1,rb and rp2 respectively. These are equivalent to the derivatives AB1,
AB3 and AB5 in the PEPA model. Clearly, the average response time for the
first job type is slightly larger than third one (AB5) and smaller than second job
(AB3), because of the reciprocal ratio between response time and responding rate.
However, average response time of all three job types grow at the same rate. The
reason is obviously that the average time for processing all the requests already
within the queue is the same, only the time to process the arriving request differs.
Thus, the difference between the response times of these three response actions
is a constant.
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Figure 4.13: Average response time varied with population size calculated by the
ODE, rb = rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01, K = 1
When we alter the rate of the second and third response actions, the difference
between the two sets of curves is quite significant, far more so than we might
naively expect.The initial stage (N = 1 ∼ 6) of the average response time of the
first type of jobs (W (1)) becomes larger as response rate decreases. Nevertheless,
all three job types tend to respond quicker than the first set as N increases,
because the average service time (1/rp1 + 1/rb + 1/rp2) is decreased, and the
proportion of this type of request waiting at the TTP is smaller.
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Moreover, multiple servers can be analyzed, as illustrated in Figure 4.14. Here,
L(1), L(3) and L(5) denote the queuing lengths for the three responding actions
by the TTP in the protocol, corresponding to AB1, AB3 and AB5 in the PEPA
model. In each set of curves, larger service rate results in a smaller number of
waiting customers. Generally, there are fewer jobs waiting if more servers are
provided. Nevertheless, the number of the first type waiting jobs (L1) with four
TTP servers reaches the number of second type jobs with two TTP servers when
N = 145, as they are fastest and slowest one in each set respectively.
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Figure 4.14: Average queue length varied with population size with different
number of servers calculated by ODEs, rb = rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 =
1, rp1 = 0.5, rp2 = 0.8, rw = 0.01
4.7 Utility function
We now introduce the utility function to answer our proposed performance ques-
tions for ZG3.
C = c1L+ c2Krp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (4.2)
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This utility function keeps the same form as which we defined in Chapter 3 for
KDC to make a consistent investigation. In this function, L denotes the average
waiting customers at the non-repudiation server (TTP), and K is the number of
servers. rp is the response rate of the TTP server. We assume the TTP server
responds any type of jobs in the same rate here. C1 and C2 are cost rates, and
they many depend on the type of system or quality of service agreement with
customers.
4.7.1 Numerical results
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Figure 4.15: Cost varied against the number of clients calculated by ODEs, K =
1, c1 = c2 = 1, rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01
Figure 4.15 presents the cost varied against the number of clients, calculated by
ODEs. Generally, the more clients come to the system, the longer the average
queue length is. As the service capacity does not change in this experiment,
therefore, the cost increases along with the number of clients according to the
utility function. Moreover, it is not difficult to find that the performance start
to degrades significantly since N = 70 when rp = 2 and N = 140 when rp = 4
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under these parameters.
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Figure 4.16: Cost varied with number of TTP servers calculated by ODEs, c1 =
c2 = 1, rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = rp = 1, rw = 0.01
Figure 4.16 shows the cost varied with the number of TTP servers, calculated
by ODEs. As we expected, the system needs more TTP server to support more
clients to keep a reasonable cost. At the early stage of increasing number of
servers, cost of service is very small. Thus, waiting customers dominate the total
costs. With more servers are introduced to the system, cost of service is increas-
ing. Meanwhile, average queue length is reducing under the same total number
of client. Therefore, cost of service will dominate the total cost finally. However,
there should be a optimal point between the two thresholds. The optimal points
in our experiment are K = 14, K = 28, and K = 42 for N = 500, N = 1000, and
N = 1500 respectively.
The relationship between cost and rate of key fresh is illustrated in Figure 4.17.
The more frequently the users request a new session key, the more workload has
been introduced in the system at TTP server. Consequently, cost of customers
waiting is increased. However, the high frequency of refreshing key gives a hacker
less time and cipher text to creak the session key. In practical situation, the
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balance need to achieve by a engineer to realise both acceptable security and
performance. In this case, we assume the balance point is the value of rw where
the cost start to increase rapidly. Hence, it is easy to find that the optimal point
here is rw = 0.008, rw = 0.014 and rw = 0.024 for one server, two servers and
four servers respectively.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter we have applied both mean value analysis and fluid approximations
to solve PEPA models of two non-repudiation protocols. Both approaches enable
systems with extremely large numbers of components to be solved efficiently.
When the population size, N , is very large, there is almost no difference between
the values obtained by either method, although the fluid approximation is slightly
quicker. However, when N is small the fluid approximation diverges in the region
around a known point, hence in such cases, mean value analysis is preferable. We
also analysed a utility function for ZG3 to further understand the system from a
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practical aspect.
In addition, this study has highlighted some limitations with the initial approach
used. The unintended competition behaviour has been solved by applying func-
tional rates and deriving ODEs. For the average response time calculation, al-
though we can solve this scenario when there is only one server (at the trusted
third party), we have not been able to apply mean value analysis (even by using
ODEs solution, we only can obtain average queue length) to the case where there
are multiple servers.
We can add two aspects to our proposed work flow by through this case study. In
simplification step, functional rates specification can be utilised to avoid to write
full detailed behaviour of the server when there is an unintended competition
between different service actions. MVA is able to utilised in the analysis stage as
an exact solution, however, it is only can be applied in our defined class of PEPA
model.
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Chapter 5
An Optimistic Fair Exchange
Protocol
5.1 Introduction
The case study in this chapter is another type of non-repudiation protocol, dif-
ferent from ZG1 and ZG3 introduced in the last chapter. This is an optimistic
non-repudiation protocol, which only utilises the third trust party when accidents
happen. This leads us to model the protocol in two ways: with misbehaviour
and without. Moreover, we employ a different modelling form, in which a server
has been considered as several threads, with each thread associated with a cus-
tomer. Hence, the service rates of the server becomes a function of the number
of threads. The analysis technique used in this case is ODEs as it is scalable and
efficient. The contribution of this Chapter are employment of a multi-threads
modelling concept and the comparison between the protocol with and without
misbehaviour.
In the next section a specification of the basic version (no misbehaviour) of the
e-commerce protocol is given. The subsequent section then introduces the PEPA
model of this basic version of the protocol, followed by numerical results. After
that, an extended version (with misbehaviour) of the e-commerce protocol is
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described. Section 5.6 gives the PEPA model and a set of ODEs for this case,
then some numerical results. We then conduct a utility function analysis in
Section 5.8. Finally this chapter has been summarised in Section 5.9.
5.2 A e-commerce Protocol (basic)
This e-commerce protocol is an optimistic non-repudiation protocol, which adopts
an oﬄine TTP (Third Tust Party) not only to ensure fair exchange, but also to
minimize the workloads from TTP server. Following the formal description in
[51], the basic protocol (without misbehaviour of any principals) is illustrated
below:
3.sendMp
4.sendCg
5.sendMk
6.sendCk
1.download
2.agreePrice
Figure 5.1: The basic protocol
There is a set environment before protocol operates, in which C (Customer) opens
an account with B (Bank) and M (Merchant) registers with the TTP. The protocol
is then covered in six steps:
1. C selects a product to purchase.(download) The customer chooses
a product, and downloads it from the Internet merchant. However, this
e-product has been encrypted, and so the customer cannot acquire the
product without a decryption key. This product can be used for validation
later.
117
2. C and M agree upon a price for the product.(agreePrice) Several
messages may be exchanged between C and M in this step.
3. C sends PO (purchase order) to M.(sendMp) The customer sends
three elements to the merchant:(a)the purchase order; (b)a digitally signed
cryptographic checksum of the PO; and (c) the PT (Payment Token).
4. M sends encrypted product to C or abort the transaction.(sendCg
or sendCabort) the merchant checks the purchase order which was re-
ceived at the last step: if the merchant is not satisfied, then an abort
message is sent to C; otherwise, the following is sent to C: (a) a sgined
cryptographic checksum of the purchase order; (b) encrypted product; (c)
signed cryptographic checksum of the encrypted product; (d) encrypted
random number; and (e) signed cryptographic checksum of the encrypted
random number.
5. C sends payment token decryption key to M or abort the trans-
action.(sendMk or sendMabort) C checks the message from M, if it is
an abort, then abort the transaction. C validates the product, and sends
M a signed abort message if the product has failed to be validated; other-
wise, sends the payment token decryption key and a signed cryptographic
checksum of the encrypted product decryption key.
6. M sends product decryption key to C or terminates the transac-
tion.(sendCk) If M receives an abort message from C, it terminates the
transaction. Otherwise, if the received PT decryption key works, M sends
the following to C:(a) the product decryption key; (b) signed cryptographic
checksum of the encryption product decryption key; (c) the multiplicative
inverse of a random number; (d) signed cryptographic checksum of the en-
crypted multiplicative inverse of the random number.
To address the performance aspects of this protocol, this illustration focuses on
the behaviour. Therefore the security contents have been eliminated from the de-
scription above. The original paper [51] gives a more detailed version. Moreover,
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the protocol presented here is the basic version without TTP involved, as a “no
dispute” assumption has been made. An extended model with misbehaviour of
participants will be illustrated in Section 6.
5.3 PEPA Model of the basic protocol
In this work, we consider a scenario of a number of customers buying an e-
product from a merchant under this fair exchange protocol. This merchant has
been divided to number of threads (T ) to serve each customer, and the number
of threads has been allocated in dynamic way which means the threads number
depend on the number of active customers. Therefore, all the rates of active
actions of the merchant depend on the active customers numbers. In other words
it depends on the state of the system, through a functional rate. The more
threads that have been allocated, the slower the individual rate of each thread.
Consequently, these functional rates and the number of threads are in inverse
ratio. The model is formulated as:
C0
def
= (download, rd).C1
C1
def
= (agreePrice, ra).C2
C2
def
= (sendMp, rsmp).C3
C3
def
= (sendCg, f1).C4 + (sendCabort, f2).C7
C4
def
= (sendMk, rsmk).C5 + (sendMabort, rsma).C6
C5
def
= (sendCk, f3).C6
C6
def
= (work, rw).C0
C7
def
= (sendMabort, rsma).C6
T0
def
= (download, rd).T1
T1
def
= (agreePrice, ra).T2
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T2
def
= (sendMp, rsmp).T3
T3
def
= (sendCg, f1).T4 + (sendCabort, f2).T7
T4
def
= (sendMk, rsmk).CT5 + (sendMabort, rsma).T6
T5
def
= (sendCk, f3).T6
T6
def
= (work, rw).T0
T7
def
= (sendMabort, rsma).T6
System
def
= C0[N ]BCL T0[N ]
Where, L = {download, agreePrice, sendMp, sendCg, sendCabort, sendMk,
sendMabort, sendCk,work}
f1 = rscg, f2 = rsca, f3 = rsck, (if N = 1);
f1 =
rscg
C3+1
, f2 =
rsca
C3+1
, f3 =
rsck
C5+1
, (if N > 1).
Again, as each customer and merchant thread are tightly coupled, the partial
evaluation [11] approach has been employed and the model as follows:
CT0
def
= (download, rd).CT1
CT1
def
= (agreePrice, ra).CT2
CT2
def
= (sendMp, rsmp).CT3
CT3
def
= (sendCg, f1).CT4 + (sendCabort, f2).CT7
CT4
def
= (sendMk, rsmk).CT5 + (sendMabort, rsma).CT6
CT5
def
= (sendCk, f3).CT6
CT6
def
= (work, rw).CT0
CT7
def
= (sendMabort, rsma).CT6
System
def
= CT0||CT0|| · · · ||CT0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
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Where, f1 = rscg, f2 = rsca, f3 = rsck, (if N = 1);
f1 =
rscg
CT3+1
, f2 =
rsca
CT3+1
, f3 =
rsck
CT5+1
, (if N > 1).
CT0 to CT7 in the above model denote the different states and the evolution of the
CT component. The work action is utilized to define that customers can use the
product to do something before returning to state CT0 to buy another product,
which forms a working cycle to investigate the steady state. The system consists
of a number of parallel independent CT components that are initialized with
state CT0. Each customer has been partially evaluated with a merchant thread,
hence no cooperation between the new combined components CT . In addition,
the functional rate we mention above has been roughly defined as “the rate of
merchant active actions when only one customer involved in the system” divided
by “the number of active customers associated with there relevant action plus one”
if more than one customer in the system, following the rule that they are in inverse
ratio. Those functional rates have been expressed as f1, f2 and f3 in our model.
This assumption is probably not acceptable from engineering aspect. However,
it’s not possible to get a accurate functional rate expression without practical
experiment. Hence, the main purpose of this work is to show the feasibility
of this kind of modelling and analysis approach rather than practical results.
Additionally, the reason to add one in the denominator of the functional rate is
to avoid the numerical fault in ODE analysis by using Matlab in next section.
However, the addend could be ignored with increasing number of customers.
5.3.1 ODE analysis
Once again, because of the scalability and efficiency properties, ODEs have been
employed here. The set of ODEs for this fair exchange protocol can be derived
following the approach of Hillston [34].
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ddt
CT0(t) = rwCT6(t)− rdCT0(t)
d
dt
CT1(t) = rdCT0(t)− raCT1(t)
d
dt
CT2(t) = raCT1(t)− rsmpCT2(t)
d
dt
CT3(t) = rsmpCT2(t)− rscg
CT3 + 1
CT3(t)− rsca
CT3 + 1
CT3(t)
d
dt
CT4(t) =
rscg
CT3 + 1
CT3(t)− rsmkCT4(t)− rsmaCT4(t)
d
dt
CT5(t) = rsmkCT4(t)− rsck
CT5 + 1
CT5(t)
d
dt
CT6(t) =
rsck
CT5 + 1
CT5(t) + rsmaCT7(t) + rsmaCT4(t)− rwCT6(t)
d
dt
CT7(t) =
rsca
CT3 + 1
CT3(t)− rsmaCT7(t)
In our analysis we are interesting in the average number of waiting clients that
are represented by the sum of number of CT3 and CT5 in steady state(t →
∞). Following this thread modelling concept, it a simple matter to calculate the
average response time for each service action of a merchant thread as:
WsendCg =
1
f1
(t→∞),
WsendCabort =
1
f2
(t→∞),
WsendCk =
1
f3
(t→∞).
5.4 Numerical results of the basic protocol
Figure 5.2 shows the average number of waiting customers in sendCg and send-
Cabort against total number of customers involved in the system. As we would
expect, the average number of waiting customers increases when the population
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Figure 5.2: Average number of waiting customers in sendCg and sendCabort
varied with population size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation,rd =
ra = rb = rsmp = rsmk = rscg = rsck = rsca = rsma = 1, rw = 0.01
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Figure 5.3: Average number of waiting customers in sendCk varied with popu-
lation size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation,rd = ra = rb = rsmp =
rsmk = rscg = rsck = rsca = rsma = 1, rw = 0.01
size increases. In the initial stage, the increase rate is slow, and it become grater
when N is large. Obviously, this results follows the common consensus that ODE
gives very accurate results when the system is large. In this situation, the large
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Figure 5.4: Average response time of action “sendCg(sendCabort)” varied with
population size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation,rd = ra = rb =
rsmp = rsmk = rscg = rsck = rsca = rsma = 1, rw = 0.01
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Figure 5.5: Average response time of action “sendCk” varied with population
size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation,rd = ra = rb = rsmp = rsmk =
rscg = rsck = rsca = rsma = 1, rw = 0.01
scale has been defined as N > 250, as ODE and simulation results are converge
from this area. However, this is not reflected in another part of total queue
length (average number of waiting customers in sendCk, CT5), and which is show
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in Figure 5.3. It not difficult to identify two issues from this graph: firstly, the
number of CT5 becomes almost stable and increases extremely slowly in both
ODE and stochastic simulation analysis; then, ODE results and SS results do not
coverage for CT5 even when N = 350 and beyond, tough they converge for CT3
if N > 250. So, we go back to the PEPA model, and address the rates that flow
into CT3 (rsmp), flow out from CT3 (f1 and f2), flow into CT5 (rsmk) and flow out
from CT5 (f3). The rates rsmp and rsmk are fixed, hence, f1, f2 and f3 are the
keys to affect the results. As we know, f1, f2 and number of CT3 are in inverse
ratio, and f3 and CT5 are in inverse ratio, therefore, f3 is much larger (up to 100
times) than f1 and f2 as more customers are involved in the system, according to
the results of number of CT3 and CT5 in steady state from Figure 5.2 and Figure
5.3, especially when N > 200. Hence, more customers have been blocked in the
CT3 state as more customers arrive, and so the change of number of customers
in state CT5 becomes very small. This is also the reason for divergence between
the ODE and SS results. From the number of CT5 in Figure 5.3, obviously, this
is still a very small scale for CT5 even when N = 350, because the very slow rate
f1 causes a very few customers flowing into state CT5 when N is large. Once the
average number of waiting customers has been acquired, we can easily calculate
average response time using the formulas given in last chapter, shown in Figure
5.4 and Figure 5.5. The profiles of the curves of average response time for action
sendCg(sendCabort) and sendCk are quite similar to those of their queue lengths.
5.5 Extended protocol
The protocol illustrated in Section 5.2 is a basic version, that operates without
misbehaviour of any participants. As this is an optimistic fair exchange protocol,
it is necessary to investigate the performance of the TTP. Following [51], to get
TTP to operate, several misbehaviours have been introduced as follows:
M behaves improperly:
• M receives the payment token decryption key in step 5, but does not send
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the correct product decryption key in step 6.
1. C send all he got in the exchange to TTP. (sendTPall)
2. TTP asks M to send the correct decryption key and start a timer.
(notifyM1)
3. M send the correct key to TTP or has no response. (sendTPk1 or
tiemout1)
4. if M sends the correct key, TTP forwards the key to C; if not, TTP
sends a decryption key which preserved before this exchange to C and
take appropriate action against M. (sendCkbyTP1 or sendCkbyTP2,
takeactionM)
• M receives the payment token decryption key in step 5, but disappears
without sending the product decryption key.
1. C’s timer expires. (noresponsedelay)
2. C send all he got in the exchange to TTP. (sendTPall)
3. TTP asks M to send the correct decryption key and start a timer.
(notifyM2)
4. M has no response. (timeout2)
5. TTP sends a decryption key which preserved before this exchange to C
and take appropriate action against M. (sendCkbyTP2, takeactionM)
• M claims that it did not send the correct decryption key because it has not
received payment.
1. M sends the reason that he did not receive proper payment. (sendT-
Preason)
2. M still need to send product decryption key to TTP. (sendTPk2)
3. Once TTP got the product decryption key from M, he sends appro-
priate decryption key to M and C. (sendMkbyTP1, sendCkbyTP3)
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C behaves improperly: M got the payment decryption key from TTP again
after he claims the wrong key in first instance. However, he still can not decrypt
the payment by the key again:
1. Notify TTP that the fail of using the payment decryption key again. (sendTP-
noti)
2. TTP gets in touch with Bank to obtain a new key. (getkfromB)
3. Sends the new key to M. (sendMkbyTP2)
Again, the description above is mainly about behavior, in order address perfor-
mance. More detailed security content has been described in [51]. The terms in
the brackets after each item with bold font are the action name we used in the
PEPA model. Moreover, we would like to propose three performance questions
for this extended protocol as well as our previous case studies: “how many clients
can a given TTP configuration support?”, “how much service capacity must we
provide at a TTP to satisfy a given number of clients?” and “what is the maxi-
mum rate at which keys can be refreshed before the TTP performance begins to
degrade?” These questions are answered through numerical results in section 5.8.
5.6 PEPA Model of extended protocol
According to the same scenario of basic protocol, extended version can be mod-
elled following:
CT0
def
= (download, rd).CT1
CT1
def
= (agreePrice, ra).CT2
CT2
def
= (sendMp, rsmp).CT3
CT3
def
= (sendCg, f1).CT4 + (sendCabort, f2).CT7
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CT4
def
= (sendMk, rsmk).CT5 + (sendMabort, rsma).CT8
CT5
def
= (sendCk, f3).CT6 + (noresponsedelay, rn).CT14
CT6
def
= (work, rw).CT0 + (sendTPall, rstp).CT9
CT7
def
= (sendMabort, rsma).CT8
CT8
def
= (work, rw).CT0
CT9
def
= (notifyM1, r1).CT10
CT10
def
= (sendTPk1, f7).CT11 + (timeout1, r10).CT12
CT11
def
= (sendCkbyTP1, r3).CT8
CT12
def
= (sendCkbyTP2, r4).CT13
CT13
def
= (takeactionM, r6).CT8
CT14
def
= (sendTPall, rstp).CT15
CT15
def
= (notifyM2, r2).CT16
CT16
def
= (sendTPreason, f4).CT17 + (timeout2, r11).CT12
CT17
def
= (sendTPk2, f5).CT18
CT18
def
= (sendMkbyTP1, r7).CT19
CT19
def
= (sendCkbyTP3, p ∗ r5).CT20 + (sendCkbyTP3, (1− p) ∗ r5).CT8
CT20
def
= (sendTPnoti, f6).CT21
CT21
def
= (getkfromB, r9).CT22
CT22
def
= (sendMkbyTP2, r8).CT8
TP
def
= (notifyM1, r1).TP + (notifyM2, r2).TP + (sendCkbyTP1, r3).TP
+(sendCkbyTP2, r4).TP + (sendCkbyTP3, r5).TP
+(takeactionM, r6).TP + (sendMkbyTP1, r7).TP
+(sendMbyTP2, r8).TP + (getKfromB, r9).TP
+(timeout1, r10).TP + (timeout2, r11).TP
System
def
= TP [K]BCL CT0[N ]
Where, L = {notifyM1, notifyM2, sendCkbyTP1, sendCkbyTP2,
sendCkbyTP3, takeactionM, sendMkbyTP1, sendMkTP2, getKfromB,
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timeout1, timeout2},
r1 = rnm1
CT9∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r2 = rnm2
CT15∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r3 = rscktp1
CT11∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r4 = rscktp2
CT12∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r5 = rscktp3
CT19∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r6 = rta
CT13∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r7 = rsmktp1
CT18∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r8 = rsmktp2
CT22∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r9 = rkb
CT21∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r10 = rt1
CT10∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),
r11 = rt2
CT16∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP ),∑
waitingJobsTP =
∑
∀iCTi(t), i ∈ {9, 15, 11, 12, 19, 13, 18, 22, 21, 10, 16}.
if N = 1:
f1 = rscg, f2 = rsca, f3 = rsck, f4 = rstpr, f5 = rstpk, f6 = rstpno, f7 = rstpk,
if N 6= 1:
f1 =
rscg
CT3+1
, f2 =
rsca
CT3+1
, f3 =
rsck
CT5+1
, f4 =
rstpr
CT16+1
, f5 =
rstpk
CT17+1
, f6 =
rstpno
CT20+1
,
f7 =
rstpk
CT10+1
.
Compared to the PEPA model of basic protocol, a number of actions have been
added. Thus, the number of local states of the CT component increases to 23,
elearly enlarging the state space. Furthermore, the number of functional rate
expressions has been extended to 7, each following the same formula as in the
model of basic protocol. Let f1 to f7 denote these functional rates. Following a
previous study in Chapter 4, a new kind of functional rates have been applied to
avoid over estimating the value of rates of cooperation actions, which are denoted
by ri, i = 1, 2, · · · , 11. Each of these functions describes the actual service rate if
there is one job in the system(rnm1, rnm2, rscktp1, rscktp2, rscktp3, rta, rsmktp1, rsmktp2,
rkb, rt1 and rt2), or as a proportion of the number of waiting jobs (at TTP) of
each type (CTi/
∑
waitingJobsTP , i = 9, 15, 11, 12, 19, 13, 18, 22, 21, 10, 16) and
the times of service (min(TP,
∑
waitingJobsTP ), which allocates each service
with respect to its job type to eliminates the potential race.
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5.6.1 ODE analysis
Again, a set of ODEs, which represents the PEPA model of extended protocol,
can be generated as follows:
d
dt
CT0 = rwCT6(t) + rwCT8(t)− rdCT0(t)
d
dt
CT1 = rdCT0(t)− raCT1(t)
d
dt
CT2 = raCT1(t)− rsmpCT2(t)
d
dt
CT3 = rsmpCT2(t)− rscg
CT3(t) + 1
CT3(t)− rsca
CT3(t) + 1
CT3(t)
d
dt
CT4 =
rscg
CT3(t) + 1
CT3(t)− rsmkCT4(t)− rsmaCT4(t)
d
dt
CT5 = rsmkCT4(t)− rsck
CT5(t) + 1
CT5(t)− rnCT5(t)
d
dt
CT6 =
rsck
CT5(t) + 1
CT5(t)− rwCT6(t)− rstpCT6(t)
d
dt
CT7 =
rsca
CT3(t) + 1
CT3(t)− rsmaCT7(t)
d
dt
CT8 = rsmaCT4(t) + rsmaCT7(t)
+rscktp1
CT11(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
+rta
CT13(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
+(1− p)rscktp3 CT19(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
+rsmktp2
CT22(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )− rwCT8(t)
d
dt
CT9 = rstpCT6(t)− rnm1 CT9(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT10 = rnm1
CT9(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
− rstpk
CT10(t) + 1
CT10(t)
−rt1 CT10(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT11 =
rstpk
CT10(t) + 1
CT10(t)
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−rscktp1 CT11(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT12 = rt1
CT10(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
+rt2
CT16(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
−rscktp2 CT12(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT13 = rscktp2
CT12(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
−rta CT13(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT14 = rnCT5(t)− rstpCT14(t)
d
dt
CT15 = rstpCT14 − rnm2 CT15(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT16 = rnm2
CT15(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
− rstpr
CT16(t) + 1
CT16(t)
−rt2 CT16(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT17 =
rstpr
CT16(t) + 1
CT16(t)− rstpk
CT17(t) + 1
CT17(t)
d
dt
CT18 =
rstpk
CT17(t) + 1
CT(17)(t)
−rsmktp1 CT18(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT19 = rsmktp1
CT18(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
−rscktp3 CT19(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT20 = prscktp3
CT19(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
− rstpno
CT20(t) + 1
CT20(t)
d
dt
CT21 =
rstpno
CT20(t) + 1
CT20(t)
−rkb CT21(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
d
dt
CT22 = rkb
CT21(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
−rsmktp2 CT22(t)∑
waitingJobsTP
min(
∑
waitingJobsTP , TP )
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ddt
TP = 0
Where,
∑
waitingJobsTP =
∑
∀iCTi(t), i ∈ {9, 15, 11, 12, 19, 13, 18, 22, 21, 10, 16}.
In this analysis, we are primarily interesting in average number of waiting cus-
tomers and average response time. The total waiting customers consist of cus-
tomers waiting at Merchant (L(merchant)) and TTP (L(ttp)), and they are cal-
culated as:
L(merchant) =
∑
∀i
CTi + CT10 ∗ ( f7
f7 + r10
) + CT16 ∗ ( f4
f4 + r11
), i ∈ {3, 5, 17, 20}.
L(ttp) =
∑
∀i
CTi + CT10 ∗ ( r10
f7 + r10
) + CT16 ∗ ( r11
f4 + r11
),
i ∈ {9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22}.
It is easy to find that, in state CT10 and CT16, customers have been forked
into either the waiting service from the merchant or TTP. Hence, the average
waiting customers in CT10 and CT16 has been divided into two parts according
to the relevant rate of racing in above equations. As with the queue length, the
average response time also contains two types. A merchant’s mean response time
is calculated as:
Wmerchant−i =
1
fi
, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
And following the previous study in Chapter 4, we can only evaluate the model
when the number of TTP (K) is 1. To apply the arrival theorem, the average
response time at the TTP can be approximately calculated as:
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Wttp−i(N) =
∑
∀i
Li(N − 1)
ri
+
1
ri
, i ∈ {1, · · · , 11}.
Where, L1 = CT9, L2 = CT15, L3 = CT11, L4 = CT12, L5 = CT19, L6 = CT13, L7 =
CT18, L8 = CT22, L9 = CT21, L10 = CT10 ∗ ( r10f7+r10 ), L11 = CT16 ∗ ( r11f4+r11 ).
Furthermore, we intend to investigate the proportion of satisfied customers (been
served), which defined as:
Ps(N) =
CT8
N
.
5.7 Numerical results of extended protocol
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Figure 5.6: Average number of waiting customers at TTP varied with population
size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all
other rates are 1.
Figure 5.6 compares the average number of waiting customers at TTP against ini-
tial population of customers calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation. The
queue length increases when more clients are involved in the system. However, it
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is not difficult to spot that the two curves seems to keep a constant error when N
is larger than 120. This phenomenon does not follow the ODE’s normal excellent
accuracy when N is very large. To investigate more deeply, we find that the
population of behaviours after CT12 is actually very small, due to the race that
between action sendTPk and timeout1 in component CT10, and also between ac-
tion sendTPreason and timeout2. In the case where N = 240, it is a simple matter
to calculate the functional rate of sendTPk f7(N = 240) ≈ 0.85397, and the func-
tional rate of timeout1 r10(N = 240) ≈ 0.0020397. The large difference also exists
between sendTPreason and timeout2. About 400 times difference causes just a
few components evolving to CT12 and its further (evolving) behaviours. Thus,
N = 240 still can not be considered as a large scale system with the current set
of rates. That explains why the two methods do not converge when N = 240.
Nevertheless, the two curves will converge eventually in some value of N . To take
a further experiment, we set rt1 and rt2, the original rates of timeout1 and time-
out2, to 200, and keep all other rates unchanged. This is in order to switch more
clients to the behaviours after CT12. Still in case of N = 240, L(ODE) ≈ 99.9595
and L(SS) ≈ 100.0637, illustrating the argument above.
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Figure 5.7: Average number of waiting customers at merchant varied with popu-
lation size calculated by ODEs and stochastic simulation, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and
all other rates are 1.
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The average number of waiting customers at the merchant is presented in Figure
5.7. Generally, the more customers involved, the more customers that will be
waiting at the merchant. However, the results calculated by ODEs and stochastic
simulation do not converged. This is caused by the same reason as discussed
above. When the TTP is working for misbehaviour cases, it is become very busy
(if there is only one TTP server, as in our model) and most of the customers are
waiting for the TTP. Therefore, the scale of the queue length at the merchant
remains very small. This is why results of ODE and stochastic simulation did
not converge here.
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Figure 5.8: Average number of waiting customers with and without TTP varied
with population size calculated by ODEs, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all other rates
are 1.
The total average waiting customers with and without misbehaviour have been
compared in Figure 5.8. Under the same rates for each relevant actions and the
same involved number of customers, far more customers are waiting in a situa-
tion of misbehaviour, especially, when N is very large. That is an intuitive and
expected result, because customers who encounter misbehaviour have recourse to
the TTP for help, and then wait at the TTP. Hence, it is clear that misbehaviours
reduce the performance of the whole system, and also demonstrate that this kind
(optimistic) non-repudiation protocol could perform much better than those that
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always employ an on-line TTP.
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Figure 5.9: Average response time at merchant varied with population size cal-
culated by ODEs, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1.
Figure 5.9 shows the average response time for the merchant at different actions.
Overall, if we increase total number of clients in the system, the merchant takes
longer to process each individual request. However, the response time increases
slowly, and that is caused by the queue length which has been shown in Figure
5.7. Following our functional rates definition for the merchant (fi), it is intuitively
understood that queue length and response time should have the same increasing
ratio. Moreover, more customers waiting for action sendCg and sendCabort than
others, this gives longer a response time for these two actions.
Then, we experiment to increase the capacity of the TTP to twice that shown
before (2), and plot the results for average response time for the TTP in all actions
and the merchant in action sendCg in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11. From Figure
5.10, it is clear to spot that the response time for customers waiting at TTP is
smaller if the TTP is more powerful. Nevertheless, the average response time
for customers waiting at the merchant for action sendCg increases if we double
the TTP’s capacity. A quicker response from the TTP means that the number
of customers waiting at misbehaviour stage decreases. Under the same total
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Figure 5.10: Average response time for TTP varied with population size calcu-
lated by ODEs, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1 except for rTTP ,
where rTTP ∈ {rnm1, rnm2, rscktp1, rscktp2, rscktp3, rta, rsmktp1, rsmktp2, rkb, rt1, rt2}.
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Figure 5.11: Average response time for sendCg varied with population size cal-
culated by ODEs, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1 except for rTTP ,
where rTTP ∈ {rnm1, rnm2, rscktp1, rscktp2, rscktp3, rta, rsmktp1, rsmktp2, rkb, rt1, rt2}.
number of clients, more customers go to the normal stage without misbehaviour.
Consequently, the number of customers (CT3) waiting for action sendCg increases,
and the average response time for these customers takes longer.
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Figure 5.12: Proportion of satisfied customers varied with population size cal-
culated by ODEs, p = 0.5, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1 except for rTTP ,
where rTTP ∈ {rnm1, rnm2, rscktp1, rscktp2, rscktp3, rta, rsmktp1, rsmktp2, rkb, rt1, rt2}.
Finally, we plot the proportion of satisfied customers (been served) in Figure
5.12. Generally, the proportion decreases for both case (rTTP = 1 and rTTP = 2)
if more customers come to the system. The two curves are very close before the
point, N = 120, and both keep a very high percentage of satisfied customers in
this area. After that point, those percentages start to go down clearly. However,
the proportion for rTTP = 1 drops more quickly than the other, and it becomes
50% when N = 240, while the percentage for rTTP = 2 is still above 80%.
5.8 Utility function of extended protocol
Again, we apply the similar utility function to answer our proposed performance
questions for extended protocol.
C = c1L+ c2Krp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (5.1)
The same as the cost function in Chapter 3 and 4, L denotes the average waiting
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customers at the non-repudiation sever (TTP), and K is number of servers. rp is
the response rate of the TTP . We assume the TTP server responds any type of
jobs in the same rate here. C1 and C2 are cost rates, and they many depend on
the type of system or quality of service agreement with customers.
5.8.1 Numerical results
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Figure 5.13: Cost varied against the number of clients calculated by ODEs, p =
0.5, K = 1, c1 = c2 = 1, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1
Figure 5.13 shows the cost varied against the number of clients calculated by
ODEs. Similar to the results of cost function in Chapter 3 and 4, more clients
results in more waiting customers with fixed service capacity. Therefore, the total
cost increases along with the cost of customer waiting goes up. Furthermore, it
is a simple matter to find that the cost rises rapidly when N is around 130, and
this is the maximum capacity that the TTP server can handle before performance
start to significantly degrade.
Figure 5.14 presents the cost varied with number of TTP servers calculated by
ODEs when total number of clients is 500. Again, customer waiting costs more in
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Figure 5.14: Cost varied with number of TTP servers calculated by ODEs, p =
0.5, N = 500, c1 = c2 = 1, rw = 0.01 and all other rates are 1
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Figure 5.15: Cost varied with rate of work calculated by ODEs, p = 0.5, N = 300,
c1 = c2 = 1, all other rates are 1 except for rw
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initial stage. Along with the system being given more servers, number of waiting
clients is reduced. However, the cost of service dominate the total cost. The
optimal point is around 2 in this case.
Figure 5.15 shows the cost varied with the rate of refresh key, rw, calculated by
ODEs. With fixed service capacity and total number of clients, more frequently
refresh the session key results in more workload has been added in the system.
Therefore, the cost of customer waiting increases. Similarly, we can easily find
that the balance point between performance and security is around rw = 0.002.
5.9 Summary
This chapter investigates an optimistic fair exchange protocol in an e-commerce
environment. According to the optimistic characteristic, we model the protocol
when the third trust party is oﬄine and online respectively. Additionally, in this
work, we consider the merchant server consists of several threads; PEPA works
well in this style of modelling. The ODE solution do not converge with stochastic
simulation when N is very large. However, in this context, this large N only gives
large scale for part of the derivatives, and they are still may converge under other
rates. Finally, a utility function has been analysed to better understand the
system.
This case study learnt a new modelling form that can be added to our proposed
work flow. In the modelling stage, the server (resource) can be modelled as serval
threads with associated functional rates.
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Chapter 6
Kerberos Protocol
6.1 Introduction
This chapter explores a common authentication protocol, known as Kerberos.
The first PEPA model of multi-realms scenario is cumbersome to manage, be-
cause we need to change every customer’s behaviour if one more realm is added
to the whole environment (this situation has not been studied in previous chap-
ters). Hence, a simplified model, which is bisimilar to the original one, has been
proposed. To cope with state space explosion, following previous studies, an
ODE based fluid flow analysis is employed to solve the models. The results are
compared with stochastic simulation, and also compared with the original model.
The novelty of this Chapter is the aggregation technique we applied to reduce
the model components.
In the next section, a specification of the multi-realm Kerberos environment has
been described. Then, the scenario is modeled in PEPA. After that, the original
PEPA model has been simplified in Section 6.4, followed by fluid flow analysis of
the simplified model. Numerical results are presented in the subsequent section.
In Section 6.7, a utility function has been adapted to evaluate the protocol.
Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 6.8.
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6.2 Protocol specification
Figure 6.1 illustrates a full-service Kerberos environment, which is termed a realm.
A realm usually consists of a Kerberos server, several clients, and some application
servers. A Kerberos server can work as both an Authentication server (AS) and
a Ticket granting server (TGS). Several realms form a network that we want to
investigate. As any clients in a realm can request service from local application
servers or remote application servers, following the Kerberos protocol (version 4)
specification in [59], two work flows have been defined:
Kerberos
Clients (N)Servers (K)
AS
TGS
Figure 6.1: One realm in multi-realms Kerberos protocol
• a client requests service from local application server
1. A client (U) requests a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) from local AS(a
function of Kerberos server, denoted by KDC in context). (requestTGT)
2. Local AS sends TGT to U. (responseTGT)
3. U requests a service-granting ticket (SGT) from local TGS(a function
of Kerberos server, denoted by KDC in context). (requstSGTl)
4. Local TGS sends SGT to U. (responseSGTl)
5. U request a service from a local application server (S) using SGT that
received from TGS in last step. (requestSl)
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6. Local S delivers the service to U. (responseSl)
• a client requests service from remote application server
1. U requests a TGT from local AS. (requestTGT)
2. Local AS sends TGT to U.(responseTGT)
3. U requests a ticket for remote TGS from local TGS. (requestTGTr)
4. Local TGS sends the ticket for remote TGS to U. (responseTGTr)
5. U requests SGT for remote application server from remote TGS. (re-
questSGTrr)
6. Remote TGS sends U the SGT for the remote application server. (re-
sponseSGTrr)
7. U requests a service to remote application server. (requestSrr)
8. The remote application server delivers the service to U. (responseSrr)
These two work flows concurrently exist with a probability (P ) which will be
introduced in sections of models.
6.3 The model
Following the protocol depiction in the previous section, our Kerberos scenario
can be modelled through PEPA as:
∀i :
Ui0
def
= (requestTGTi, rqtgt).Ui1
Ui1
def
= (responseTGTi, p ∗ rxi1).Ui2l
+
∑
∀j 6=i
(responseTGTi,
1− p
M − 1 ∗ rxi1).Ui2rj
Ui2l
def
= (requestSGT li, rqsgtl).Ui3
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Ui3
def
= (responseSGT li, rxi2).Ui4
Ui4
def
= (requestSli, rqsl).Ui5
Ui5
def
= (responseSli, ryi1).Ui6
Ui6
def
= (worki, rw).Ui0
∀j 6= i, f, g, k :
Ui2rj
def
= (requestTGTrij, rqtgtr).Ui(7+q∗5)
Ui(7+q∗5)
def
= (responseTGTrij, rxif ).Ui(8+q∗5)
Ui(8+q∗5)
def
= (requestSGTrrij, rqsgtrr).Ui(9+q∗5)
Ui(9+q∗5)
def
= (responseSGTrij, rxig).Ui(10+q∗5)
Ui(10+q∗5)
def
= (requestSrrij, rqsrr).Ui(11+q∗5)
Ui(11+q∗5)
def
= (responseSrij, ryik).Ui6
KDCi
def
= (responseTGTi, rxi1).KDCi + (responseSGT li, rxi2).KDCi
+
∑
∀j 6=iand∀f
(responseTGTrij, rxif ).KDCi
+
∑
∀j 6=iand∀g
(responseSGTrji, rxig).KDCi
Si
def
= (responseSli, ryi1).Si +
∑
∀j 6=iand∀k
(responseSrji, ryik).Si
System
def
=
∏
∀i
(Ui0[N ])BCL (
∏
∀i
(KDCi)||
∏
∀i
(Si[K]))
Where i, j ∈ 1, 2, · · · ,M (M is the number of realms).
q = j − 1, j < i; q = j − 2, j > i.
f ∈ {an|an = a1 + (n− 1)d}, a1 = 3, d = 1, n = M − 1.
g ∈ {bn|bn = b1 + (n− 1)d}, b1 = a1 +M − 1, d = 1, n = M − 1.
k ∈ {cn|cn = c1 + (n− 1)d}, c1 = 2, d = 1, n = M − 1.
L = {responseTGTi, responseSGT li, responseSli, responseTGTrij,
responseSGTrji, responseSrji}(∀j 6= i).
rxi1 = rptgt
Ui1(t)
Ui1(t)+Ui3(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t)
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∗min(Ui1(t) + Ui3(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t), KDCi)
rxi2 = rpsgtl
Ui3(t)
Ui1(t)+Ui3(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t)
∗min(Ui1(t) + Ui3(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t), KDCi)
∀j 6= i, f, g
rxif = rptgtr
Ui(7+q∗5)(t)
Ui1(t)+Ui3(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t)
∗min(Ui1(t) + Ui3(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t), KDCi)
rxig = rpsgtr
Ui(9+q∗5)(t)
Ui1(t)+Ui3(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t)
∗min(Ui1(t) + Ui3(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5)(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5)(t), KDCi)
ryi1 = rpsl
Ui5(t)
Ui5(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(11+q∗5)(t)
∗min(Ui5(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(11+q∗5)(t), Si)
∀j 6= i, k
ryik = rpsr
Ui(11+q∗5)(t)
Ui5(t)+
∑
∀q Ui(11+q∗5)(t)
∗min(Ui5(t) +
∑
∀q Ui(11+q∗5)(t), Si)
In the formal definition of a PEPA model of the Kerberos protocol above, i
denotes the ith realm, and therefore the all components of the model is replicated
for every realm (M realms in total). A branch is shown in Ui1: clients which
would like to get service from local servers will consequently behaviour as Ui2l
with probability p, and those who want to request remote servers will reach state
Ui2rj (sum of all j 6= i) with probability 1 − p. Hence, Ui2l to Ui5 denote states
for the local actions of realm i, and Ui2j to Ui(11+q∗5) are the states in a remote
requesting phase. Finally, they all come to state Ui6, and we then add a work
action before the clients starting another request from the initial stage Ui0 to
make it as cycle to investigate the steady state. This work action means that the
clients do something else or just a simple delay after getting service from servers,
and is utilised to control the requesting frequency.
In this model, the initial phase of remote requesting is represented by
∑
∀j 6=i
(responseTGTi,
1− p
M − 1 ∗ rxi1).Ui2rj
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j denotes all the realms remote to realm i, therefore, this sum contains M − 1
items. Each of these items has its own sequential actions for the remote requesting
stage. Hence, Ui2rj to Ui6 in the above model is replicated M − 1 times (all
remote realms; ∀j 6= i) for each local realm (i). Subscript q, utilised for the client
component in the remote requesting stage, is used to denote different names
of derivatives for each remote realms (∀j 6= i). As those realms are assumed
homogeneous, they have the same probability to be requested. This probability
is calculated by the total probability for remote requesting (1 − p) dividing by
the number of remote realms (M − 1).
The servers described in the model only execute their service actions. For the
KDC server, responseTGTi, responseSGli and responseTGTrij(∀j 6= i) are lo-
cal actions in realm i, and the subscript in responseTGTrij denotes that the
local KDC in realm i responds a TGT to local clients. However, this TGT is
utilised to request a remote KDC in realm j. The remote actions of a KDC are
responseSGTrji(∀j 6= i), and this means that the local KDC in realm i responds
a SGT to remote clients from one of the remote realms j. Similarly, an applica-
tion server (S) responds to local clients (in realm i) by action responseSli, and to
remote clients through actions responseSrji(∀j 6= i), which indicates a response
to remote clients from realm j by application server in local realm i. Following
previous study in Chapter 4, functional rates have been employed to avoid the
race between different responding services in the same server. The functional
rates are defined as the product of the actual service rate if there is only one
job in the system, the proportion of the number of waiting jobs of each type
and the number of instances of service; represented by rxi1, rxi2, rxif (∀f), rxig(∀g)
for KDC, and ryi1, ryik(∀k) for S. The subscript x indicates the rates of KDC
services, and y implies the rates of S. Let i denotes the number (or name) of the
realms where actions are executed; f , g and k are employed to assign different
names to those rates. Finally, the system is defined as clients in all realms (M
realms and N clients in each realm) shared all service actions with all KDC (one
in each realm) and all S (K in each realm). In this model, we assume that there
is only one type of application server in each realm.
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To understand clearly, a two reals model is presented as follows:
U10
def
= (requestTGT1, rqtgt).U11
U11
def
= (responseTGT1, p ∗ rx11).U12l + (responseTGT1, (1− p) ∗ rx11).U12r
U12l
def
= (requestSGT l1, rqsgtl).U13
U13
def
= (responseSGT l1, rx12).U14
U14
def
= (requestSl1, rqsl).U15
U15
def
= (responseSl1, ry11).U16
Ul6
def
= (work1, rw).U10
U12r
def
= (requestSGTr12, rqtgtr).U17
U17
def
= (responseTGTr12, rx13).U18
U18
def
= (requestSGTrr12, rqsgtrr).U19
U19
def
= (responseSGTr12, rx24).U110
U110
def
= (requestSrr12, rqsrr).U111
U111
def
= (responseSr12, ry22).U16
U20
def
= (requestTGT2, rqtgt).U21
U21
def
= (responseTGT2, p ∗ rx21).U22l + (responseTGT2, (1− p) ∗ rx21).U22r
U22l
def
= (requestSGT l2, rqsgtl).U23
U23
def
= (responseSGT l2, rx22).U24
U24
def
= (requestSl2, rqsl).U25
U25
def
= (responseSl2, ry21).U26
U26
def
= (work2, rw).U20
U22r
def
= (requestSGTr21, rqtgtr).U27
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U27
def
= (responseTGTr21, rx23).U28
U28
def
= (requestSGTrr21, rqsgtrr).U29
U29
def
= (responseSGTr21, rx14).U210
U210
def
= (requestSrr21, rqsrr).U211
U211
def
= (responseSr21, ry12).U26
KDC1
def
= (responseTGT1, rx11).KDC1
+(responseSGT l1, rx12).KDC1
+(responseTGTr12, rx13).KDC1
+(responseSGTr21, rx14).KDC1
KDC2
def
= (responseTGT2, rx21).KDC2
+(responseSGT l2, rx22).KDC2
+(responseTGTr21, rx23).KDC2
+(responseSGTr12, rx24).KDC2
S1
def
= (responseSl1, ry11) + (responseSr21, ry12)
S2
def
= (responseSl2, ry21) + (responseSr12, ry22)
System
def
= (U10[N ]||U20[N ])BCL (KDC1||KDC2||S1||S2)
Where L = {responseTGT1, responseSGT l1, responseTGTr12, responseSGTr21,
responseTGT2, responseSGT l2, responseTGTr21, responseSGTr12, responseSl1,
responseSr21, responseSl2, responseSr12}
rx11 = rptgt ∗ U11U11+U13+U17+U29 ∗min(U11 + U13 + U17 + U29, KDC1)
rx12 = rpsgtl ∗ U13U11+U13+U17+U29 ∗min(U11 + U13 + U17 + U29, KDC1)
rx13 = rptgtr ∗ U17U11+U13+U17+U29 ∗min(U11 + U13 + U17 + U29, KDC1)
rx14 = rpsgtr ∗ U29U11+U13+U17+U29 ∗min(U11 + U13 + U17 + U29, KDC1)
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rx21 = rptgt ∗ U21U21+U23+U27+U19 ∗min(U21 + U23 + U27 + U19, KDC2)
rx22 = rpsgtl ∗ U23U21+U23+U27+U19 ∗min(U21 + U23 + U27 + U19, KDC2)
rx23 = rptgtr ∗ U27U21+U23+U27+U19 ∗min(U21 + U23 + U27 + U19, KDC2)
rx24 = rpsgtr ∗ U19U21+U23+U27+U19 ∗min(U21 + U23 + U27 + U19, KDC2)
ry11 = rpsl ∗ U15U15+U211 ∗min(U15 + U211, S1)
ry12 = rpsr ∗ U211U15+U211 ∗min(U15 + U211, S1)
ry21 = rpsl ∗ U25U25+U111 ∗min(U25 + U111, S2)
ry22 = rpsr ∗ U111U25+U111 ∗min(U25 + U111, S2)
6.4 Simplification
Clearly, the above model not only suffers from the state space explosion prob-
lem with a large population, but is also problematic to specify. Once additional
realms are added in the scenario, further remote actions are needed for clients in
the remote requesting stage, KDC servers and application servers in the model.
Consequently, the number of functional rates is increased which cause further
complexity. Therefore, it is necessary to simplify this model, especially, the re-
mote requesting stage. A homogeneous assumption leads us to consider the possi-
bility of aggregating all realms, however, the cross realm actions obstruct a simple
combing of all relevant derivatives. That is because the cross realm actions can
no longer determine which remote realm to request after aggregation. These ac-
tions are requestSGTrrij, responseSGTrij, requestSrrij and responseSrij. The
actions requestSGTrrij and requestSrrij, are active actions of local clients, and
these actions are not shared with any other component. Hence, they can be con-
sidered a simple delay, and so responseSGTrij and responseSrij become the key
issue. Following the homogeneous assumption, these realms are exactly the same.
Therefore, each KDCi is the same (KDC1 ≡ · · · ≡ KDCi ≡ · · · ≡ KDCM). We
then can infer that all responseSGTrji are the same. Hence, responseSGTrji ≡
responseSGTrij. From an overall performance view, a KDC server responding to
a remote client is equivalent to one responding a relevant local client. Similarly,
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responseSrji ≡ responseSrij. Now, the original model is able to be aggregated
and simplified as follows:
U0
def
= (requestTGT, rqtgt).U1
U1
def
= (responseTGT, p ∗ rx1).U2l + (responseTGT, (1− p) ∗ rx1).U2r
U2l
def
= (requestSGT l, rqsgtl).U3
U3
def
= (responseSGT l, rx2).U4
U4
def
= (requestSl, rqsl).U5
U5
def
= (responseSl, ry1).U6
U6
def
= (work, rw).U0
U2r
def
= (requestTGTr, rqtgtr).U7
U7
def
= (responseTGTr, rx3).U8
U8
def
= (requestSGTrr, rqsgtrr).U9
U9
def
= (responseSGTr, rx4).U10
U10
def
= (requestSrr, rqsrr).U11
U11
def
= (responseSr, ry2).U6
KDC
def
= (responseTGT, rx1).KDC + (responseSTGl, rx2).KDC
+(responseTGTr, rx3).KDC + (responseSGTr, rx4).KDC
S
def
= (responeSl, ry1).S + (responseSr, ry2).S
System
def
= U0[M ∗N ]BCL (KDC[M ]||S[M ∗K])
where L = {responseTGT, responseSGT l, responseTGTr, responseSGTrr,
responseSl, responseSr}.
rx1 = rptgt
U1(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx2 = rpsgtl
U3(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
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rx3 = rptgtr
U7(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx4 = rpsgtr
U9(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
ry1 = rpsl
U5(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
ry2 = rpsr
U11(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
M is number of realms, N is number of clients in one realm, K is number of
application servers in one realm.
where L = {responseTGT, responseSGT l, responseTGTr, responseSGTrr,
responseSl, responseSr}.
rx1 = rptgt
U1(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx2 = rpsgtl
U3(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx3 = rptgtr
U7(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx4 = rpsgtr
U9(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
ry1 = rpsl
U5(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
ry2 = rpsr
U11(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
M is number of realms, N is number of clients in one realm, K is number of appli-
cation servers in one realm.
Original Model Simplified Model Original Model Simplified Model∑
∀i Ui0 U0
∑
∀i
∑
∀j 6=i Ui2rj U2r∑
∀i Ui1 U1
∑
∀i
∑
∀q Ui(7+q∗5) U7∑
∀i Ui2l U2l
∑
∀i
∑
∀q Ui(8+q∗5) U8∑
∀i Ui3 U3
∑
∀i
∑
∀q Ui(9+q∗5) U9∑
∀i Ui4 U4
∑
∀i
∑
∀q Ui(10+q∗5) U10∑
∀i Ui5 U5
∑
∀i
∑
∀q Ui(11+q∗5) U11∑
∀i Ui6 U6
∑
∀iKDCi KDC∑
∀i Si S
6.5 ODE analysis
d
dt
U0 = rwU7(t)− rqtgtU0(t)
d
dt
U1 = rqtgtU0(t)− rx1
d
dt
U2l = p ∗ rx1 − rqsgtlU2l(t)
d
dt
U3 = rqsgtlU2l(t)− rx2
d
dt
U4 = rx2 − rqslU4(t)
d
dt
U5 = rqslU4(t)− ry1
d
dt
U6 = ry1 + ry2 − rwU6(t)
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of relevant derivatives between original and simplified
model
Figure 6.2 presents all derivatives from the aggregated model and its relevant
states in the original model. Obviously, the state space is reduced to some ex-
tent, and it is easier to write it down for different populations by only changing
number of realms (M) and clients (N) rather than changing system behaviour,
as in original model. However, transient behaviours of this simplification are
different from the original model, because some individual behaviours have been
eliminated, and those relevant behaviour are combined to one action.
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6.5 ODE analysis
From the lessons we have learned from previous studies, fluid flow approxima-
tion (based on ODE) has been chosen as the scalable analysis technique here.
Following the approach in [34], the set of ODEs of aggregated model is derived
below:
d
dt
U0(t) = rwU7(t)− rqtgtU0(t)
d
dt
U1(t) = rqtgtU0(t)− rx1
d
dt
U2l(t) = p ∗ rx1 − rqsgtlU2l(t)
d
dt
U3(t) = rqsgtlU2l(t)− rx2
d
dt
U4(t) = rx2 − rqslU4(t)
d
dt
U5(t) = rqslU4(t)− ry1
d
dt
U6(t) = ry1 + ry2 − rwU6(t)
d
dt
U2r(t) = (1− p) ∗ rx1 − rqtgtrU2r(t)
d
dt
U7(t) = rqtgtrU2r(t)− rx3
d
dt
U8(t) = rx3 − rqsgtrrU8(t)
d
dt
U9(t) = rqsgtrrU8(t)− rx4
d
dt
U10(t) = rx4 − rqsrrU10(t)
d
dt
U11(t) = rqsrrU10(t)− ry2
d
dt
KDC(t) = 0
d
dt
S(t) = 0
Where:
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rx1 = rptgt
U1(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx2 = rpsgtl
U3(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx3 = rptgtr
U7(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
rx4 = rpsgtr
U9(t)
U1(t)+U3(t)+U7(t)+U9(t)
min(U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t), KDC)
ry1 = rpsl
U5(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
ry2 = rpsr
U11(t)
U5(t)+U11(t)
∗min(U5(t) + U11(t), S)
To explore the performance of servers, we investigate the average queue length and
average response time for the KDC and the application server in this analysis.
In the aggregated model, the number of average waiting clients in the KDC is
represent by the sum of U1(t), U3(t), U7(t) and U9(t) when t → ∞. Following
the homogeneous assumption, all waiting clients are equally distributed in each
realm. Hence, the average queue length for each KDC is calculated as:
L(KDC) =
U1(t) + U3(t) + U7(t) + U9(t)
M
. (t→∞)
Similarly, total number of waiting clients in S is U5(t) + U11(t)(t → ∞), which
can be divided by the number of realms to obtain the average queue length for
S in one realm as:
L(S) =
U5(t) + U11(t)
M
. (t→∞)
In terms of the average response time, the same problem has been faced as pre-
vious study. If we apply Arrival Theorem to calculate average response time for
multiple servers with multiple jobs, the most essential item need to known is the
time takes for one server to become available, and the prerequisite is understand-
ing the order of different jobs in the queue. However, the order is not possible (or
not easy) to be obtained. Therefore, firstly, the average response time is defined
as waiting time here, which just means the average time to process all the jobs
in the queue. We then approximated it as the sum of the time of each type of
154
jobs being processed by all servers as follows:
W (KDC) =
U1(t)
M ∗ rptgt +
U3(t)
M ∗ rpsgtl +
U7(t)
M ∗ rptgtr +
U9(t)
M ∗ rpsgtr . (t→∞)
W (S) =
U5(t)
M ∗K ∗ rpsl +
U11(t)
M ∗K ∗ rpsr . (t→∞)
This approximation assumes each type of jobs are all equally served by all servers.
Apparently, closer for the time of processing those types of jobs, more accurate
for this approximated results. One can imagine that if a extremely large job is
processed firstly, and it will block other small jobs for a long time. This is a huge
difference to move it to the end of the queue.
In addition, we would like to propose similar performance questions for Kerberos
protocol: “how many clients can a given Kerberos server configuration support?”
and “what is the maximum rate at which keys can be refreshed before the Ker-
beros performance begins to degrade?” As there is only one Kerberos server is
each realm, we get ride of the question about varying the number of servers in this
case study. These questions are answered through numerical results in section
5.8.
6.6 Numerical results
Figure 6.3 shows the average queue length calculated by ODEs against the number
of client in each realm, and verified by stochastic simulation with two realms.
Overall, more involved customers cause more clients waiting at the KDC server.
The diverged part between ODEs and stochastic simulation occurs when N is in
interval of 20 to 50. For N > 50, ODE coincides with results from stochastic
simulation, which follows the rule that fluid approximation approaching exact
results with large population, and the large population can be defined as 50
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clients at the KDC in this case. The same comparison is presented in Figure 6.4
for application server (S). More clients waiting at S with increasing number of
clients in each realm (N), however, the curves flatten out as N increases. For
the whole system, the busier server KDC is, the more customers are waiting
at KDC than at S. Therefore, more clients of new arrivals are blocked at the
KDC rather than S, and this then leads the increasing rate reduced along with
N . This is also the reason that results of ODE and stochastic simulation do not
converge for S. Reviewing the value of queue length in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4,
the number of clients waiting at KDC are 100 times more then S. The scale of
number of customers waiting at S is still very small, and apparently results from
the ODEs cannot converge to stochastic simulation at this scale.
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 compare the average queue length calculated from the
original model and simplified model by ODEs, in the case of two realms and
three realms, respectively. As the original model is hard to specify with four
realms and more, it is only possible to conduct this comparison manually for
a maximum of three realms. Those comparisons show that these results from
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Figure 6.3: Average waiting customer for KDC varied with population size calcu-
lated by ODEs and stochastic simulation, rqtgt = rptgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rpsgtl =
rqsl = rpsl = rptgtr = 1, rqsgtrr = rpsgtr = rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rw = 0.01, p =
0.6, K = 1,M = 2
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Figure 6.4: Average waiting customer for S varied with population size calculated
by ODEs and stochastic simulation, rqtgt = rptgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rpsgtl = rqsl =
rpsl = rptgtr = 1, rqsgtrr = rpsgtr = rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rw = 0.01, p = 0.6, K =
1,M = 2
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Figure 6.5: Average waiting customer for KDC and S varied with population
size for two realms simplified model and original model calculated by ODEs,
rqtgt = rptgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rpsgtl = rqsl = rpsl = rptgtr = 1, rqsgtrr = rpsgtr =
rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rw = 0.01, p = 0.6, K = 1,M = 2
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Figure 6.6: Average waiting customer for KDC and S varied with population
size for three realms simplified model and original model calculated by ODEs,
rqtgt = rptgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rpsgtl = rqsl = rpsl = rptgtr = 1, rqsgtrr = rpsgtr =
rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rw = 0.01, p = 0.6, K = 1,M = 3
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Figure 6.7: Average waiting time for customers at KDC and S varied with pop-
ulation size for three realms and two realms of simplified model calculated by
ODEs, rqtgt = rptgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rpsgtl = rqsl = rpsl = rptgtr = 1, rqsgtrr =
rpsgtr = rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rw = 0.01, p = 0.6, K = 1
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simplified model are exactly the same as original model, and it needs less time
to write the model down and less time to analyse that is considered efficient.
Additionally, it is noticed that the queue length for each KDC and application
server S for two realms is the same as those for three realms. This demonstrates
that adding a extra realms does not affect the overall performance of each server.
In this scenario, the remote requests will be shared amongst the remote realms.
Once a realm is added, more clients are coming the system, however, more servers
coming along too, and this could hold the balance between servers and consumers.
Nevertheless, for the whole system (network), there are far more waiting clients
in three realms than two realms. The situation is different for average waiting
time that illustrated in Figure 6.7. In Figure 6.7, we compared the average
waiting time for the customers waiting at KDC and S in case of three realms and
two realms. Generally, more clients involved in the system leads each customer
waiting longer, and the time for waiting at KDC is longer than waiting at S
which caused by the queue length (see Figure 6.5 and 6.6). However, different
from same queue length for each KDC and S for two and three realms, the
average waiting time for two realms are not equal to three realms, and it is longer
in three realms. The reason is that even the total queue length for each KDC does
not change, proportion of remote requests increasing if additional realm is added.
As we set that remote actions are slower then local actions, servers responds those
additional new remote requests slower. Hence, it is increasing the average waiting
time once adding additional realms.
6.7 Utility function
Once again, we apply the similar utility function to answer our proposed perfor-
mance questions for Kerberos protocol.
C = c1L+ c2rp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (6.1)
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Slightly different from the cost functions in previous Chapters, there is no number
of servers (K) here. This is because we intent to evaluate one individual realm in
this case, and there is only one Kerberos server in each realm under the scenario.
L denotes the average waiting customers at the non-repudiation server (TTP) in
one realm, and rp is the sum of the rates of local response (rptgt, rpsgtl, rptgtr) and
remote response (rpsgtr). C1 and C2 are cost rates, and they many depend on the
type of system or quality of service agreement with customers.
6.7.1 Numerical results
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Figure 6.8: Cost varied against the number of clients calculated by ODEs, p = 0.6,
M = 3, c1 = c2 = 1, rw = 0.01, rqtgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rqsl = rpsl = 1,
rqsgtrr = rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rlocal ∈ {rptgt, rpsgtl, rptgtr}, rremote = rpsgtr
Figure 6.8 shows the cost varied against the number of clients calculated by ODEs.
As we expected, the queue length of customer at Kerberos server increases if more
clients come to the system. Consequently, the cost goes up under fixed service
capacity. When the local rate is 1 and the remote rate is 0.5, the performance
significantly degrades at the point where N = 38. If we double the rates for all
local and remote responses, this point goes to around N = 93.
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Figure 6.9: Cost varied with rate of work calculated by ODEs, p = 0.6, M = 3,
N = 100, c1 = c2 = 1, rw = 0.01, rqtgt = rqsgtl = rqtgtr = rqsl = rpsl = 1,
rqsgtrr = rqsrr = rpsr = 0.5, rlocal ∈ {rptgt, rpsgtl, rptgtr}, rremote = rpsgtr
Figure 6.9 presents the cost varied with the rate of refresh key, rw. Generally,
frequently refreshing the session key leads more workload has been added to the
system. Hence, cost increases with the number of waiting customers goes up.
When we double the response rates, the cost is smaller. The reason is that the
cost of customer waiting is reduced more than the increment of cost of service
capacity. However, the two curves becomes very close when rw is large, and this is
because the difference of costs of customer waiting for two curves become smaller
with a very large workload involved. Different from previous case studies, there
is no obvious point here to make a balance between security and performance.
Nevertheless, a security manager still could choose a heuristic balance point in
particular applications.
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6.8 Summary
In this chapter we modelled a version of the Kerberos protocol with cross realm
requests. Even under an homogeneous assumption, the original model is cum-
bersome to formulate and suffers from commonly known state space explosion
problem. We then simplified the original model by aggregating some relevant
states, and it has been analysed by ODE approximation then verified by stochas-
tic simulation. Through comparison of the aggregated model and the original
model, this simplification is shown to obtain exact results for the overall perfor-
mance of the system. Additionally, adding a realm to the system does not affect
the performance of an individual server in this case. In this work, we assume
there are K but only one type of S in each realms. It is possible to add more
types of application server by naming it differently, however, this would obviously
increase the complexity, with more extra behaviours added. Finally, we apply the
techniques to a utility function to make a efficient capacity analysis to answer
our proposed performance questions.
Through this case study, an aggregation technique can be added to the proposed
work flow in simplification stage to decrease the difficulty of analysis when partial
evaluation is not applicable.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Further Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis five security protocols have been modelled and analysed, and these
protocols can be classified into different categories in order of complexity in terms
of system behaviour. We have applied the analysis techniques that have been
learned from former ones to latters. Firstly, in Chapter 3, we explored the per-
formance of a model of a key distribution centre, as it is a simple and basic
protocol for an initial case study. In the preliminary stage, we have proposed
three modelling choices to discuss and selected one which is simple, but which
captures the necessary behaviour. However, the chosen modelling method still
suffers from the commonly known state space explosion problem. We therefore
firstly implemented a simulation of the model, then an approximation is pro-
posed to simplify system behaviour, and finally ODE analysis has been applied
as a deterministic fluid flow analysis. The approximation shows good accuracy
of prediction compared with simulation, scales exceptionally well and is fast to
compute. ODE results have been compared with those derived from the approx-
imation, unfortunately it is not always as accurate as our simplification and we
have not been able to obtain all our desired metrics. On the other hand, the ODE
approach does not suffer the same numerical problems as the approximation, it
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is extremely efficient to solve and it is shown to be extremely accurate when the
number of clients is huge. Finally, these techniques have been applied to a util-
ity function to explore the capacity planning for a system associated with this
protocol.
Then, two non-repudiation protocols, to be referred as ZG1 and ZG3, have been
studied in Chapter 4. ZG1 has similar system behaviour to KDC in the pre-
vious chapter, therefore we can directly apply partial evaluation and the ODE
approximation to solve it. However, the ZG3 model introduces an unintended
race between different service actions for the non-repudiation server. This prob-
lem has been solved by specifying functional rates to the servers for each type of
jobs. The ZG3 is able to be modelled and analysed through partial evaluation
and ODE approximation. The ODE analysis for PEPA with functional rates can
be either solved by coding in Matlab, or by translating to a CMDL model and
solved with the PEPA Eclipse plugin. Mean value analysis (MVA) has been
firstly applied for PEPA models here, and compared with ODE analysis through
numerical results. Both approaches enable systems with extremely large num-
bers of components to be solved efficiently. When the population size, N , is very
large, there is almost no difference between the values obtained by either method,
although the fluid approximation is slightly quicker. However, when N is small
the fluid approximation diverges in the region around a known point, hence in
such cases, mean value analysis is preferable.
In Chapter 5, we modelled an optimistic fair exchange protocol, which is another
type of non-repudiation protocol. In contrast to ZG1 and ZG3 in the previous
chapter, this optimistic non-repudiation protocol employs an off-line Third Trust
Party (TTP ) that is only being activated if a dispute occurs between involved
clients. Therefore, two models are formulated: one for the case where there is no
dispute and one for the case where the TTP is involved with resolving a dispute.
Furthermore, we consider the Merchant server as consisting of several threads
and each thread is partially evaluated with a client. Hence, the response action
rates of the Merchant server becomes a functional rate, which depends on the
active number of relevant clients. In the model of the extended protocol (TTP
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involved), the version of the functional rates used in ZG3 is employed to avoid the
race between different actions of the TTP server. Following the previous study,
the ODE approximation is adopted as the most efficient analysis technique here,
and the results are verified by stochastic simulation.
Finally, a cross-realm Kerberos protocol is investigated in Chapter 6. The orig-
inal PEPA model not only suffers from the state space explosion problem with
large populations and the large number of realms, but is also cumbersome to
formulate it. Adding additional realms to the whole system leads more actions
being specified. We therefore conduct a simplification process by aggregating
relevant states from different realms to a new state in the whole network. By
this simplification, one can easily modify parameters of population and number
of realms rather than change the system behaviour in the original model. Again,
according to our previous experience, ODE based fluid flow analysis has been ap-
plied, and the results have been verified by stochastic simulation. This simplified
model is compared with original model for a small number of realms to show the
accuracy of this aggregation. However, this simplification only works with steady
state distribution and would not be suitable if we wished to analyse transient
behaviour.
Through these case studies, we can enhance our proposed work flow as follow in
Figure 7.1.
Now, we have several modelling choices in the modelling stage. In security proto-
col, one can model the clients as the same replicated component (first and third
modelling choice in Chapter 3) or assign different name to it (second modelling
choice in Chapter 3). For the server, it can be modelled as a single component
(Chapter 3, 4, 6) or several threads (Chapter 5). However, the modelling form
only depends on the application and scenarios. If the performance model is sim-
ple and small scaled, one can directly analyse it, otherwise, the model should be
simplified. Partial evaluation is able to be employed to reduced the components
of clients (Chapter 3, 4, 5), if the clients in security protocols are tightly coupled.
Aggregation technique is also helpful to decrease the difficulty of analysis when
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Model simplification:
partial evaluation, 
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Cost function 
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queueing approximation, 
mean value analysis
Metrics
Figure 7.1: Enhanced work flow of performance analysis in context
partial evaluation is not applicable (Chapter 6). Furthermore, functional rates
specification is alternative choice to avoid to write full detailed behaviour of the
server when there is an unintended competition between different service actions
(Chapter 4, 5, 6). If the simplified model is small enough, CTMC method can be
applied (few clients in Chapter 3). In some cases (Chapter 3), the PEPA model
can be transformed to a simple closed queueing network model, one only need
to calculated the balance equation to solve the model. Another efficient analysis
is mean value analysis, however, it only can be employed with our defined class
of PEPA model (Chapter 4), though, this class will be extended in future. Fi-
nally, one can resort to ODE analysis to very large scale models (Chapter 3, 4,
5, 6). This is an approximation which only gives accurate results when system
is very large. Therefore, it is a good complement to other exact solutions. After
analysis, one can use the obtained metrics to the cost functions to analyse the
performance of the security protocols or systems. This is able to be considered
as a initial framework that can be followed for the further case studies.
166
7.2 Further work
There is a large scope for further work. This work can be classified into three
categories: addressing the limitations of current work, applying other relevant
analysis techniques to the five protocols in context, and exploring more types of
security protocols. Though the works, we aim to further enhance our framework
and generalise the performance evaluation techniques for security protocols.
Some limitations exist in this work. Firstly, we assume two clients are tightly
coupled in the process of partial evaluation in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. How-
ever, two clients might not have equal populations (e.g. 2 Alice with 3 Bob)
in some cases, therefore partial evaluation can not be applied in the case with-
out approximation. Then, we are not able to calculate average response time in
the situation of multiple server and multiple jobs, as the order of jobs are not
known. Finally, the whole system of Kerberos network is under the assumption
of homogeneous realms in Chapter 7. Obviously, a heterogeneous Kerberos cross
realm environment does not fit for our simplification process. All these limitations
remain issues of further exploration.
There are many other analysis techniques that can be attempted for these four
protocols. In this thesis we have focused exclusively on steady state performance,
whereas in practice many important metrics are transient in nature. Therefore
applying transient analysis techniques would extend the practical applicability of
this work. As ODE presents a deterministic approximation, stochastic differen-
tial equations based fluid flow analysis [29] can be applied by introducing noise
to ODE to approach the fact. Kronecker representation [36] provides a exact so-
lution to efficiently solve Markov chain with less memory needed. Product form
and semi-product form solution with Harrison’s RACT [24, 27] also can be em-
ployed to investigate those protocols in this thesis. Bradley and Hayden’s high
order moment analysis [32] can be utilised to analysis more performance metrics.
Additionally, performance measurement of prototype implementations is another
analysis approach, by which the results are not only able to be verified, but also
provide a path to validate the performance models.
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As our long term objective is a general performance analysis approach to se-
curity protocols based on trade-off analysis between security and performance,
we therefore need to explore a greater range of security protocols with respect
to system behaviour. Two such protocols are proposed here. The first one is
Netbill Security and Transaction protocol [15], which provides a layered request
and response architecture. In this protocol, one of the components acts both as
client and server. Furthermore, the Bull/Otway authentication protocol [8] aims
at establishing fresh session keys between a number of participants and a server
(one key for each pair of agents adjacent in the chain). To formulate its perfor-
mance model, partial evaluation can not be applied and additional participants
changes all system behaviour. Therefore, further scalable modelling and analysis
approaches need to be explored.
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